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ABSTRACT 
Innovation in Intelligence: An Analysis of U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Modernization 
during the Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 
by 
Laurence M. Nelson III, Master of Arts 
Utah State University, 2017 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Robert McPherson 
Department: History 
 
This thesis discusses the progression of Military Intelligence methods used by US 
Marines during the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934. Changes occurred due to the 
shifting circumstances of combat, new concepts taking place in the intelligence field, and 
individual initiative. U.S. experiences in Haiti provide an excellent study for how 
knowledge can foster success or defeat for an occupation. The periods that have increased 
information efficacy and effort often see the most dramatic U.S. successes. The growing 
bureaucratization of the occupation and personal initiative helped to introduce better 
intelligence methods. The staff officers that assumed the role of intelligence personnel 
created new forms for recording intelligence reports and made past intelligence more 
accessible to military command. Individual ingenuity led to the assassination of 
Charlemagne Peralte, the central leader of the caco revolt. The importance of intelligence 
efforts during a counterinsurgency operation is made plain in this historical analysis of 
the occupation of Haiti by U.S. forces during the early twentieth century. (Pages 145) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
Innovation in Intelligence: An Analysis of U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Modernization 
during the Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 
Laurence Merl Nelson III 
 
Increasing modernization in military technology and methodology occurred 
during the beginning of the twentieth century. These changes had a direct effect on how 
U.S. Marines practiced military intelligence during the occupation of Haiti from 1915-
1934. The use of military intelligence had an impact on the outcome on the occupation 
but was not the only factor that contributed to U.S. military victories. My thesis explains 
that the improvement of intelligence methods used by Marines in Haiti occurred as a 
result of outside influence, changing circumstance in Haiti, and individual agency. Major 
failures had occurred that allowed resistance to grow unchecked in the Haitian 
countryside. With the introduction of full-time military intelligence officers and 
improved data documentation, the intelligence collected became more useful to Marine 
Corps leadership. The staff officers that assumed the roles of intelligence personnel 
created new forms for recording intelligence reports and made past intelligence more 
accessible to military command. Individual ingenuity led to the assassination of 
Charlemagne Peralte, the central leader of the caco revolt. This thesis discusses the 
intelligence innovation that occurred during the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1935.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The changing use of military intelligence in Haiti, from 1915-1934, occurred 
because of the shifting circumstances of the occupation, outside influences, and 
individual actions of the Marines that participated in the occupation. The military 
intelligence practices of the Marines in Haiti aided in the suppression of rebel forces and 
the partial achievement of their nation-building objective. The purpose of this paper is to 
describe why military intelligence was employed differently over time in Haiti. It will 
also discuss which intelligence methods were effective and which were not. Further, it 
will explain how and why the use of intelligence changed during the occupation of Haiti. 
The term “military intelligence” is meant to describe both the gathering of relevant 
information about the enemy and the exploitation of that information. The intelligence 
gathered by the Marines and their sources in Haiti was of a political, social, and military 
nature because U.S. forces were required to maintain control of Haitian society. The 
Marines were expected to build a new nation in Haiti and to suppress those who might 
oppose their regime.
1
 At times during the occupation, U.S. Marines chose to focus their 
intelligence efforts on invalid targets that distracted them from real problems rising up 
around them. It is important to note that this narrative promotes the belief that both 
leadership and lower ranking members of the occupation had an effect on the 
development of intelligence methods. A great leap forward in intelligence occurred with 
                                                 
1
 United States and Atlee Pomerene, Treaty with Haiti. Treaty between the United States and Haiti. 
Finances, Economic Development and Tranquility Of Haiti. Signed at Port-Au-Prince, September 16, 1915. 
(Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1922), http://archive.org/details/treatywithhaiti00pomegoog, 8-9. 
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the implementation of a more systemized intelligence bureaucracy that could analyze, 
translate, and organize intelligence reports. The creation of improved reports allowed 
intelligence personnel to gain more effective information about the enemy. The changes 
brought about by the lower ranking members of the occupation force occurred because 
they constantly experimented with how they could use intelligence in the conditions they 
faced. Many examples of lower level adaptation dot this work, like the use of vigilantes 
and employment of individual agents. The uses of intelligence varied due to the changing 
circumstances of the occupation, the changes occurring in the outside world, and the 
Marines who applied them.  
 Carl von Clausewitz refers to military intelligence as information “which we have 
of the enemy and his country.”2  Clausewitz goes on to describe the unpredictable nature 
of any information gained under military conditions. William P. Upshur, who served with 
the U.S. Marines in Haiti, later, went on to help write the Small Wars Manual after 
serving as commander of the Marine Corps training schools at Quantico. His definition of 
intelligence gives insight into how the Marines viewed it during the last few years of the 
occupation of Haiti. Upshur states, “Military Intelligence, in a broad sense, comprises the 
most complete and authentic information of a possible, potential, or actual enemy or 
theater of operations that can be obtained and the strategical or tactical conclusions 
reached by a critical analysis of that information.”3 Upshur had developed this definition 
                                                 
2
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 75. 
3
 William P. Upshur, “Small Wars,” circa 1929, Herold H. Utley Papers, Series 14/D/5/1, Box 2, Folder 1, 
U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Quantico, VA. 
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by 1930.
4
 His two tours in Haiti, among the most prominent moments of his career, 
influenced his definition.  
The term “intelligence,” as used in this paper, refers to the same basic information 
defined by Clausewitz and Upshur, that of information about the enemy and his 
geography. The term is also extended beyond the military use because the Marines in 
Haiti were called upon to keep an eye on the political, social, and military conditions in 
Haiti. They did not immediately come to Haiti prepared to gather intelligence of a 
political or social nature, but the conditions they faced would force them to adopt this 
measure.  
The intelligence methods employed at the start of the occupation appeared 
reminiscent of the Spanish-American War and, by the end, of many methods used during 
WWI. Usage of mounted horse patrols, runners to deliver new intelligence, and using 
unverified information from unfriendly peasants made up much of the intelligence 
repertoire. The commanding officer had to do all the analysis of information without 
supporting staff, and he had to pass it on using somewhat primitive means. After WWI 
aircraft or motorized patrols, wireless radio communication improved patrolling 
techniques, and the newly revitalized local sources led to a dramatic difference in how 
intelligence affected the Haitian campaign. The uses of full-time intelligence officers to 
analyze, organize, and maintain intelligence information gave the leadership an 
infrastructure that they could rely on to keep them up to date with changing 
circumstances. Experimenting with different types of patrolling, combat and 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. 
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reconnaissance combined the benefits of two types of patrolling that had been attempted 
independently during the early phases of the occupation.
5
 When used in conjunction, they 
were able to take advantage of the strengths of each and avoid the weakness inherent in 
both. Adaptation often resulted from trial and error, which all levels of the occupation 
participated in during their time in Haiti.  
The scholarship about the occupation of Haiti contains many differing 
perspectives as well as narratives that agree on many of the relevant facts of the 
occupation. The aspects covered include the political, social, and military themes of the 
occupation. The political analysis addressed mainly by Hans Schmidt, and Brenda 
Plummer provided a view of how the occupation impacted the political elites of Haiti. 
The social themes thoroughly discussed by Mary Renda introduced how “Paternalism,” 
the dominant view of “U.S. Americans,” affected Haitian-American relations during the 
occupation.
6
 The military analysis came in two groups, but both only partially cover 
events in Haiti. The first group of military analysis discusses the growing military 
bureaucracy and gives insights into how they began to influence the military 
establishment. These include Jeffery Dorwart’s Office of Naval Intelligence and History 
of the Military Intelligence Division by Bruce Bidwell. Mars Learning by Keith Bickel 
represents the second group of analysis, which describes military learning during the 
interventions of the early 20
th
 century.  
                                                 
5
 Leo J. Daugherty III, Counterinsurgency and the United States Marine Corps Volume 1, the First 
Counterinsurgency Era, 1899-1945 (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2015), 81-82. 
6
 Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940, 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 24. 
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Scholars agree that U.S. policy and implementation of that policy in Haiti provide 
a reliable basis for analysis. It is commonly believed that the Wilson administration saw 
Haiti as militarily and politically valuable. Most scholars see the German question as 
central in the minds of American policymakers. The German threat is depicted within the 
scholarship as overblown by the Americans because of the inability of any sizable 
German force to extricate itself from the fighting in Europe.
7
 The scholarship shows 
Haitian instability resulted from weak financial conditions that are only increased by the 
chronic political instability. This cyclical effect is a simplification of the many difficult 
challenges facing the economic and political development of Haiti.  
Historian Hans Schmidt published his diplomatic and political narrative about the 
occupation of Haiti in 1971. There had been sufficient time since the occupation to 
provide proper perspective and allowed the author to distance himself from the historical 
actors he depicted. He wrote during the reign of historical, narratives that focused on 
political events. When Schmidt discussed social or cultural issues like racism, he 
concentrated on the race relations between the Haitian elites and the American 
leadership.
8
 The relationship between Marines in the field and the native population 
developed differently than Marines living in a segregated community in Port au Prince. 
Schmidt’s depiction of the occupation shows a political or military system led from the 
top that was not influenced by the lower ranks. The lack of extensive theoretical analysis 
promoted a more source-driven narrative, and while this makes for very careful 
                                                 
7
Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1995), 92. 
8
Ibid., 139. 
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scholarship depicting events in Haiti, it does not attempt to explain a great deal about 
how individuals or the masses interacted with the occupation. Schmidt sees military 
actions as the means of subjugation but does not try to provide a thorough understanding 
of the methods used by the Marines to succeed. Schmidt’s work remains useful because it 
methodically plods through the leadership’s decisions and attempts to explain why they 
took the actions they did. This thesis will analyze these decisions and those of the lower 
ranks, providing answers as to why certain members of the occupation force chose to use 
some methods rather than others in Haiti.  
Brenda Plummer in Haiti and the Great Powers bridges the gap between the 
nearly non-theoretical work of Schmidt and the highly theoretical works that came later. 
Plummer argues that the actions in Haiti by the “great powers” motivated by 
neomercantilism and the strategic location of Haiti vis-á-vis the Panama Canal forced 
them to act.
9
 Plummer attempted to make Haitians agents in their history despite the 
apparent focus on foreign intervention. She sought to allow Haitian agency in their past 
by reviving and then silencing an old theory of Haitian modernity that postulates that the 
constant Haitian rebellion cycle that existed before the occupation was the road to a new 
Haiti.
10
 Haiti and the Great Powers provides an interesting pre-occupation narrative that 
succeeded in telling the story of the years just before the occupation. Plummer strives to 
remind her reader that the Haitians did their best to build up their nation but faced 
irreconcilable factors that used prior systems of cacoism based in maroonage to make 
progress impossible. Cacos were rural fighters that fought against political and economic 
                                                 
9
Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902--1915, (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1988) 11. 
10
Ibid., 10.  
7 
 
 
 
subjugation. Plummer introduces an important idea discussed by Laurent Dubois and 
mentioned by C.L.R. James, that cacoism was a deeply cultural act with strong roots in 
Haiti’s past.11 When cacoism is better understood, it becomes easier to discover why 
some methods of intelligence were more efficient than others in the specific 
circumstances of the occupation in Haiti. This thesis connects maroonage and cacoism as 
methods of outcast sections of society attempting to maintain independence or even 
influence those at the center of power.  
Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, by Mary 
Renda, uses theory to analyze the culture of the occupation forces in Haiti. Renda 
employs a post-modern theory of discourse, which comes from the concepts introduced 
by Michel Foucault.
12
  Renda favors the primarily paternalistic pattern of thought and she 
describes it as a “cultural mechanism by which the occupation conscripted men into the 
project of carrying out U.S. rule.”13 Paternalism is the view, similar to that of 
slaveholders, that certain peoples are child-like and therefore unable to govern 
themselves effectively. Renda uses statements from notable Marines like Smedley Butler 
to show how they viewed themselves as fathers to the unready Haitian people.
14
 The 
evidence is convincing, and Renda provides valuable insight into Marine justifications for 
the occupation, but she portrays paternalism to be the ultimate “cultural mechanism” in 
                                                 
11
C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (London: 
Penguin Adult, 2001), 20. 
12
 Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940, 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 24. 
13
Ibid., 13. 
14
 Ibid., 24. 
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the minds of Marines without a great deal of further exploration.
15
 The cultural analysis 
provided by Renda will intersect with this thesis because it will examine the motives and 
views of the Marines in Haiti in an attempt to explain why they chose the intelligence 
methods they did. This thesis will not completely refute nor totally rely on the concept of 
paternalism to explain the views of the Marines in Haiti. Race, nation, and class will be 
engaged to attempt to color more fully the views of the Marines. These categories should 
provide more explanatory power about individual choices.  
The military scholarship that studies the occupation of Haiti does not completely 
cover the events in Haiti. There is one significant military history that deals with the more 
precise military doctrine and strategies used there. Mars Learning by Keith Bickel is a 
well-written and thorough look at how the Marine Corps changed during the “small 
wars” period from 1915-1940. Bickel does not focus exclusively on Haiti but instead uses 
the many different small wars of the period to illustrate the systematic changes in the 
Corps. Bickel’s scope prevents him from very specific military intelligence analysis, but 
his work is very useful for understanding the basic strategic and doctrinal concerns of the 
occupation in Haiti. Mars Learning studies how the small wars influenced the overall 
development of the Marine Corps.
16
 My thesis will avoid drawing conclusions about the 
wider Corps but will address how Marines in Haiti coped with the realities of the Haitian 
campaign. 
World War I and Origins of US Military Intelligence by James Gilbert provides a 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 24. 
16
 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 1. 
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fabulous source for information about what technical, tactical, and methodological 
changes took place in Europe in U.S. military intelligence. James Gilbert does not 
attempt to cover other conflicts occurring simultaneously, like Haiti, but focuses nearly 
exclusively on the Army developments occurring in Europe during WWI. The proposed 
thesis and this title may seem to “pass each other in the night,” but they have similar 
objectives. They include how technology developed during WWI and changed 
intelligence practices. My thesis will answer a more specific version of that question, 
explaining how that same technology and tactical development affected the occupation 
force in Haiti. Another clear difference between my approach and Gilbert’s is that I will 
be analyzing factors that are unrelated, or at least peripheral, to WWI. This aim and 
several others will make my thesis and Gilbert’s work related but separate. His narrative 
was focused mainly on the technological changes to military intelligence work, whereas 
this thesis will discuss the changes taking place in Haiti including those that do and do 
not relate to WWI. Gilbert demonstrated how the relationship between technology and 
information work became forever connected by the events of World War I.
17
 Gilbert 
describes how European bureaucratic intelligence systems influenced and tutored the 
American system but does not afford that the same prominence as technology.   
The military intelligence bureaucracy that today is a hallmark of the intelligence 
apparatus was in its infancy during the occupation of Haiti. The Office of Naval 
Intelligence by Jeffery Dorwart and History of the Military Intelligence Division by 
Bruce Bidwell both provide excellent sources as to how the fledgling military intelligence 
                                                 
17
 James L. Gilbert, World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow 
Press, 2012), 220. 
10 
 
 
 
organizations influenced actions in the field. Dorwart and Bidwell write in an informative 
and thorough format that allows the reader to understand the changing mission of the 
military intelligence groups during their early days in the U.S. military. Neither paints 
their respective organization as exceptionally effective at training or greatly influencing 
the actions of field soldiers. Dorwart and Bidwell do provide evidence into how many of 
the changing ideas of members of the military leadership of the time could have 
influenced their actions. I will examine what influence, if any, the military intelligence 
organizations, which existed concurrently with the occupation of Haiti, had on the 
occupation force’s use of military intelligence methods.  
The primary sources researched for this project came from the U.S. Marine Corps 
archives at Quantico, VA and the National Archives in Washington D.C. The personal 
papers at the Marine Corps archives provide the context of how Marines felt and 
explained their experiences in Haiti. Some personal papers contain relevant reports and 
communications that never made it into the government records. Smedley Butler’s 
papers, most notably, contain many of his professional documents that did not appear in 
the government record at the National Archives. The Marine Corps records there contain 
sporadic intelligence reports from the beginning to the end of the occupation. These 
reports are one of the main sources that this paper uses to determine how occupying 
forces gathered, documented, and analyzed intelligence. These primary documents show 
very clearly that documentation changed over time and dramatically improved during 
specific periods of the occupation.  
The political motives for the occupation of Haiti had its roots in the complex 
11 
 
 
 
relationship the U.S. had with Latin America. The Marines landed in Haiti in July of 
1915 after political upheaval resulted in the dismemberment of Jean Vilbrun Guillaume 
Sam, the president of Haiti. Chronic violence in Haiti had made him the seventh president 
that the people had forcibly removed from office since 1911, and the Wilson 
administration believed that the Haitian government could not continue functioning 
without intervention.
18
 The Wilson administration did not make their decision to 
intervene in Haiti haphazardly. The possibility had been in play for some time. Concern 
for the stability of their country stemmed from several political and military problems. 
Haiti was geographically near to the United States, but its chronic instability had not been 
an important issue to the Americans until after the turn of the twentieth century. With the 
opening of the Panama Canal, Americans now viewed disturbances in the Caribbean as 
potentially threatening to their national interests.
19
 The United States feared European 
intervention that could undermine the Panama Canal and U.S. control of the Caribbean.
20
 
German immigrants had built a small but influential foreign merchant class in Haiti that 
the Americans suspected had political designs. They assumed that the Germans were 
after Mole St. Nicolas, a potential port on the western coast of Haiti.
21
 World War I had 
begun the year before and thanks to the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic, Americans were 
starting to see the Germans as a real threat. The evolution of the Monroe Doctrine also 
supported U.S. action in the Caribbean. The United States had employed its tenets only a 
                                                 
18
 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1995), 55. 
19
 Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902--1915, (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1988) 11. 
20
 Ibid., 11. 
21
Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1995), 31. 
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few times during the nineteenth century including the French occupation of Mexico in 
1865. After the Spanish-American War, the Monroe Doctrine became an important 
aspect of U.S. policy. 
Some North Americans and Latin Americans had seen the Monroe Doctrine as a 
mutual defense treaty, but it was viewed very differently after the Spanish-American 
War.
22
 The Spanish-American War of 1898 put the United States in charge of the former 
colonies of Spain and changed many Americans’ views of their role in the Western 
Hemisphere. They now saw themselves as the big brother who should intervene to protect 
against European involvement in the region. The Roosevelt Corollary quantified that 
change and made it part of American strategic policy.
23
 One of the problems with this 
system was that many of the threats of European involvement came from overdrawn 
financial responsibilities. Some of the basic tenets of American values affirmed property 
rights. Debt was considered a form of the property, so that meant Americans often sided 
with the European debt holders at the expense of the Latin American nation debtors. The 
Venezuelan incident of 1902 was typical of American intervention in Latin America. The 
Venezuelans owed a significant debt to several banks with ties to several different 
European nations.
24
 A new caudillo or strongman, Cipriano Castro, took over Caracas 
and stopped payments on foreign debt. He took power through a long civil war that 
caused damage to foreign-owned property for which those governments expected 
                                                 
22
 Robert A. Goldwin and Harry M. Clor, eds., Readings in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1971), 215. 
23
 Dana Gardner Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton 
University Press, 1964), 5. 
24
 Alan McPherson, A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean, (Malden: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), 48. 
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reparations.
25
 Castro would not pay for either the damage to foreign capital or the debts 
incurred. The debt holding nations felt forced to respond and sent a joint fleet to 
Venezuela to force a resumption of payments.
26
 Theodore Roosevelt sent a larger fleet 
under the command of Admiral Dewy to end the European incursion. The Americans 
prevented an invasion, but then helped to ensure that debt payments would resume.   
Following the Roosevelt administration, the tone of the Latin American 
interventions changed and different types of action were used to achieve a new set of 
U.S. objectives. The Taft administration implemented “Dollar Diplomacy” which was 
supposed to bring Latin America deeper into the American sphere and draw it away from 
the Europe through economic ties.
27
 Taft encouraged Americans to invest in Latin 
American nations, which he believed would push European interests out.
28
 This strategic 
policy would make it so that European intervention would no longer occur in Latin 
America and the U.S. would not have to continue to enforce European grievances. The 
trouble with this policy is that it left the door wide open to military intervention because 
American property had to be protected, even at the expense of foreign sovereignty. The 
Wilson administration changed the foreign policy stance once again with dramatic 
results. He criticized the recent interventions in Latin America as abuses, but 
implemented some of the longest lasting interventions of the twentieth century. This 
contradiction was caused by the geopolitical realities that Wilson faced during his 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 48. 
26
 Ibid., 48. 
27
 Dana Gardner Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton 
University Press, 1964), 162. 
28
 “Milestones: 1899–1913 - Office of the Historian,” accessed April 21, 2017, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/dollar-diplo. 
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administration. Troubles with Mexico would touch off Wilson’s change in tone. Mexico 
was going through a long and bloody revolution that could not help but affect its 
neighbors. The intervention in 1914 at Vera Cruz, Mexico, showed how Wilson would 
interpret the Monroe Doctrine through a progressive lens. In a successful attempt to 
prompt a regime change in Mexico, he ordered the limited invasion of Mexico’s most 
important trading port and the seizure of all customs revenues. Interestingly, a shipment 
of weapons from the German government to the despised Huerta government provoked 
his order to seize the port without congressional approval.
29
  Venustiano Carranza 
overthrew the Huerta government during the short occupation of Vera Cruz which 
Wilson deemed a positive change in Mexico.
30
 Wilson learned that intervention was a 
quick way to achieve foreign policy objectives.   
Haiti’s declining stability at the beginning of the twentieth century increasingly 
appeared to draw in European interest to a sensitive zone of U.S. influence. Haiti’s 
political problems were not new, but the increased volatility with which it changed 
regimes gave the impression that it was reaching a crescendo. From 1911 to 1915 
rebellions overthrew seven presidents, several of which received an untimely end.
31
 
Haiti’s debt to France and more dangerously to Germany provided a context whereby 
several European powers felt justified in occupying the nation.
32
 The strategic importance 
of the Panama Canal Zone and the increasingly devastating war in Europe made it 
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 Dana Gardner Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton 
University Press, 1964), 270. 
30
 Ibid., 269. 
31
 “Milestones: 1914–1920 - Office of the Historian,” accessed July 28, 2016, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/haiti. 
32
 Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902--1915, (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1988) 12. 
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imperative for American interests to maintain Haiti outside European influence.
33
 
Specifically, the death of the American-backed Haitian President Jean Vilbrun Guillaume 
Sam forced the Wilson administration to act.
34
 When French Marines landed to protect 
their interests after rebels broke into the French diplomatic building in Port au Prince to 
grab Sam from a closet and tear him apart. Once U.S. Marines landed in Port au Prince, 
they immediately issued statements to the foreign delegations there that they would 
protect all foreign interests and therefore any other nations would not need to land 
troops.
35
  
U.S. Marine Corps involvement in Haiti began as a simple intervention and 
evolved into a complex occupation that lasted nearly two decades. The intelligence 
preparation for the occupation was based on several assumptions, including a belief that it 
would be a limited intervention like that in Vera Cruz. The plan, however, quickly 
escalated because of a shift in strategy made by the Wilson administration. This strategic 
shift created a framework, the Haitian-American Treaty of 1916, but the further details of 
the occupation were supposed to be worked out by the State Department. This 
organization’s eventual lack of guidance to the military leaders of the occupation caused 
a break down in mission comprehension, which would cause adverse changes in military 
intelligence priorities. The chronic issues of intelligence gathering, sharing, and use 
provided a significant challenge for U.S. Marines in Haiti.  
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The Wilson administration changed the U.S. intervention in Haiti to an 
occupation based on its view of social change. The Wilson administration was a 
conglomeration of progressive politicians that believed almost religiously in 
implementing Progressivist policy. When Wilson stated that he would “teach the South 
American republics to elect good men,” he was speaking literally of some of them.36 
Haiti received a thorough “lesson” at the end of a U.S. Marine’s bayonet. Wilson chose to 
enforce his views on political reform with a government that could no longer resist. The 
mission handed down from the State Department through the U.S.-Haitian treaty of 1916 
was a humanitarian/military mission.
37
 The agreement indicated that the occupation 
would last ten years with a possible extension for another ten as needed. The U.S. would 
provide personnel to instruct the Haitian people how to run a “civilized” and progressive 
government. The provided services including infrastructure, schooling, and police were 
to be reformed by the U.S. occupation force.     
The intelligence concerns of the Marines in Haiti were political, social, and 
military in nature. The Marines were eventually be left to their own devices in Haiti 
because of the State Department’s lack of interest, which this meant they would have to 
figure out how to maintain political control, which was parceled out among the 
occupation force. Marine Corps leadership in Port au Prince kept the national government 
in check, but the local Marine commanders supervised the local authorities. The political 
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intelligence required to maintain order and control over local authorities fell to the 
individual commander. At the beginning of the occupation there is little evidence that the 
Marines made specific reports as to the political activities of the Haitian officials, but as 
the occupation evolved, there would be weekly reports on the political situation in each 
district of Haiti. Social intelligence included reports about occupying forces concerning 
rebel forces brewing trouble. The early social intelligence approaches by the Marines 
were weak because most of the Marines did not take the caco threat seriously.
38
 They 
referred to the cacos as bandits and did not understand how deep the cacos connected into 
the community. As with the political intelligence, Marines eventually began submitting 
timely reports on social conditions throughout Haiti.  
The Marines in Haiti took military intelligence more seriously as the occupation 
progressed and their methodology improved. The methods used to obtain data in Haiti 
improved due to dramatic changes in technology, methodological improvements, and 
personal innovation. Horse patrols gave way to aerial surveillance, and military 
intelligence became more technically proficient. The use of human intelligence also 
changed due to perceived threats. The centralization of intelligence improved the 
distribution of intelligence among the dispersed garrisons. The political objectives, or 
lack thereof, from the State Department also played a role in how the Marines gathered 
and used military intelligence.
39
 Finally, individual Marines had a significant effect on 
how intelligence work progressed. The changes that occurred during the occupation of 
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Haiti were not always improvements, but much improved as they learned from hard 
experience. 
The occupation of Haiti had four distinct phases of action. The first major phase 
of the occupation was the initial stabilization followed by the second step, a short period 
of nation-building. The third phase was the suppression of a resurgence of widespread 
resistance to the occupation with the final phase lasting twelve years that saw the renewal 
of the nation-building mission in Haiti. Each of these phases saw changes to the military 
intelligence practices due to real or imagined problems. 
As active resistance in Haiti slowed, the second phase of the occupation began. 
The new objective for the occupation force was to build a new Haiti. The U.S. policy was 
to create infrastructure, the education system, and retrain the Haitian people in good 
government.
40
 The failure of Marine Corps leadership to keep a finger on the pulse of the 
political and social situation contributed to the rise of the caco revolt in 1919.  
Specifically, the incorrect intelligence focus on the German merchant minority in Haiti 
during the last years of WWI played an important role in distracting the U.S. Marines 
from their real mission. Due to incorrect perceptions about German capabilities and 
strategic designs in the Caribbean, many Marines considered the Germans living in Haiti 
to be their main threat after the caco defeat of 1916.
41
 This incorrect assumption allowed 
a popular uprising to form and break out while they watched German merchants. Some 
sources, like Hans Schmidt’s book on the occupation of Haiti, mention how the focus on 
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Germans as possible trouble makers caused problems for the Marines but this thesis will 
more directly prove that the intelligence work done on the German minority specifically 
contributed to the rise of the 1919 caco insurgency.
42
 Completely unique to this thesis is 
the belief that the problems of the second phase were inflamed by the lack of 
systematized intelligence reporting and organization. The intelligence reports coming 
from the Marines stationed at distant command posts had little value to the leadership in 
Port au Prince and without intelligence personnel they did not get much attention. This 
meant that information received from outposts did not have much effect on occupation’s 
ability to maintain order.  
The use of the corvée system, an old system of labor taxation, along with other 
oversights by the occupation helped to foment this new revolt of the cacos.
43
 The cacos 
were able to cause significant problems for the occupiers who were forced once again to 
engage them in the countryside. The violence did not subside until the Marines hunted 
down the two main leaders of the revolt.  
The resurgence of violence in Haiti provided the context for an increased focus on 
intelligence work. The Marines adapted to the changing campaign in Haiti and 
incorporated new intelligence methods learned during WWI. The technological 
advantages gained from that war included aerial reconnaissance and wireless 
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communications.
44
 Improved methods included a more centralized intelligence 
infrastructure, better skills at documentation, and the use of intelligence officers. 
Adaptation in the field played an important role in the improving efficacy of intelligence 
work being done by the occupation. The use of local civilian militias called vigilantes 
gave vital information to the Marines and provided support on patrols. Most dramatically 
the assassination of Charlemagne Peralte, the main leader of the caco revolt, showed how 
individual Marines innovated and obtained victory.   
This thesis will discuss how the Marines viewed their foe in contrast to what the 
actions of the Haitian opposition tell us about them. Military forces tend to define their 
enemies in starkly negative terms. They also ennoble their mission with the powerful 
ideology of their time and place. The Americans, and in particular the Wilson 
administration, assigned progressive values to the occupation that could resonate with 
most Americans. The occupation was to restore stability and introduce significant 
government reforms. The Wilson administration used force to export the progressive 
movement from the United States to Haiti. The goals to root out corruption and improve 
government services were basic doctrines of the progressive movement. These goals were 
put directly into the Haitian-American Treaty that legalized the American occupation.
45
  
Specifically, it gave the Marine Corps the task to improve infrastructure, schools, and 
create a new centralizing paramilitary police force.
46
 These tasks turned the Marines into 
missionaries of progressivism and enforcers of political reform. Those who opposed the 
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U.S. control were seen as the entrenched establishment merely seeking to maintain their 
power.
47
 U.S. officials considered the main attributes of the Haitian political elite to be 
corruption, slothfulness, and selfishness, leading to Marines being ordered to secure all 
the main forms of national revenue from the Haitian government from the earliest stages 
of the occupation.
48
 The Marine Corps interpretation of their enemy allowed them to 
underestimate their enemy on several occasions especially when it came to the gathering 
of intelligence.  
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CHAPTER II 
INITIAL STABILIZATION 1915-1916 
 In the years leading up to the U.S. occupation of Haiti, the United States took an 
increasingly active role in international politics, especially in the Western Hemisphere. 
The Monroe Doctrine had been emphasized and expanded with the introduction of the 
Roosevelt corollary. The Spanish-American War had proven American power, initiating 
a period of growing influence coupled with an aggressive foreign policy that redefined 
America’s role in geopolitics.49 The U.S. Marine Corps was called upon to put down 
revolts in countries within the new U.S. sphere of influence while maintaining Europe at 
arm’s length.  The intervention in Haiti was not a unique experience for the Marine Corps 
that had participated in several interventions and occupations since the turn of the 
century. Their most recent action in Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1914 had been a short-term 
localized punitive mission that helped to oust the Huerta government. Marine Corps 
doctrine, expressed in a few manuals, was in its infancy and did not formalize a system of 
intelligence.
50
 The Marines sent to Haiti used intelligence-gathering methods that they 
had employed in the past and tried some new ideas to increase effectiveness. Changing 
technology, geopolitical events, and perceptions of the mission in Haiti forced the 
Marines to adapt military intelligence to their circumstances.  
The military, social, and political situations on the ground in Haiti at the start of 
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the occupation were complex. Haiti’s President, Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, had 
ordered the deaths of seventy-two political prisoners.
51
 His support evaporated, and Sam 
fled to the French diplomatic building in Port au Prince; the families of his victims came 
for him. The crowd literally tore Sam to pieces and paraded the macabre trophies around 
Haiti’s capital.52 The government collapsed, leaving the Haitian military with little 
direction from the top. A mob of vengeful locals, including some of those involved in 
Sam’s death, took over Port au Prince and formed a committee of public safety that could 
not establish solid control in the capital.
53
 The anarchic state of the country was, in fact, 
the excuse that the Wilson administration employed to justify intervention in Haiti. The 
social conditions in Haiti were also in flux because of the political violence that exposed 
the traditional elite to real danger, as they looked to the committee of public safety to 
protect them. The Haitian lower class had either sided with the caco forces moving into 
Port au Prince or attempted to avoid the conflict. The caco groups mostly supported Dr. 
Rosolvo Bobo for the presidency, but the committee of public safety when several 
candidates within their organization that aspired to the post.
54
 Social disunity had plagued 
Haiti like many nations at the turn of the century, but the conflict between classes in Port 
au Prince helped to create conditions whereby intervention seemed to be the only answer.  
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The intelligence bureaucracy in the U.S. military had planned for the occupation 
of Haiti in 1914. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had begun to compile 
information about potential threats during the late 19
th
 century.
55
 There were State 
Department officials in Port au Prince who could give basic intelligence of the events that 
led to the breakdown of the government in the city.
56
 ONI and its work with the State 
Department was one of the first examples of joint intelligence efforts between more than 
one government agency. These first steps would contribute to the basic intelligence 
knowledge that U.S. forces had as they entered Haiti. ONI’s practice at naval war 
planning had not had many chances for testing before 1915 (following the Spanish-
American War). The ONI plan for a conflict with Haiti was, in fact, well suited to the 
political situation on the ground in 1915 because it had been planned on the basis of 
general anarchy.
57
 When naval war planners had written their war plan for Haiti, they 
planned for chaos.
58
 The original objectives established by the Office of Naval 
Intelligence were to seize control of the government buildings in Port au Prince and 
secure the international delegations in the main urban centers.
59
 The overall plan by ONI 
was promising, but the intelligence resources in place to execute its plan were not up to 
date; geographic intelligence supplied old maps that were incomplete.
60
 The confusion 
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that ensued hampered the immediate security of Port au Prince while U.S. military 
personnel attempted to secure it. The sailors sent ashore as the first landing party became 
so confused due to poor intelligence that a friendly fire incident occurred that killed two 
of them.
61
 This isolated incident was emblematic of the type of trouble the occupation 
force would have over the next two decades.   
Marine military intelligence apparatus did not exist at the time they landed in 
Haiti, while the first steps towards military intelligence modernization had not yet 
occurred. In the U.S., The Marine Corps relied heavily on the Navy for intelligence about 
its targets during its overseas work at the start of the twentieth century.  The Office of 
Naval Intelligence was operating several different attaché missions throughout the world 
by 1915, with some Marines attached to these missions.
62
 This was the precursor to the 
rise of Marine Corps intelligence officers. The Corps did not have any specific doctrine 
for intelligence gathering so they gained it through experience.
63
 Their general military 
doctrine was a hodge-podge of Army and Navy concepts unchanged for Marine use.
64
 
Most military lessons the Corps learned were through experience and sage-like advice 
from senior Marines; lessons from previous campaigns were applied but the experience 
and what these lessons might have taught varied on the individual. During the first part of 
the campaign in Haiti, the Marines could rely on their previous experience and their naval 
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leadership for their basic intelligence needs, but as the naval leadership withdrew they 
were forced to adapt to their new role. 
The broader events addressed previously were catalysts for the way the Marines 
and the Haitian people interacted with each other. Their exchanges militarily, politically, 
and socially provided the context for the military intelligence developments in Haiti. 
Marines in Haiti had to deal with troubles created by their predecessors and those already 
existing before they arrived. The tragic social conditions of Haiti helped to shape the 
typical American view of the Haitian people.
65
 The view of the population dramatically 
affected the way Marines used intelligence during their time as occupiers. U.S. 
expeditions in other parts of the world like Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic 
progressed along similar strategic lines as those in Haiti, but there were some differences 
in how they adapted to the changing strategic circumstances specific to each region. The 
next section of this paper will address the military intelligence methods employed by the 
Marines in Haiti.  
The initial phase of the U.S. occupation of Haiti was a joint effort of the U.S. 
State Department, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Haitian government. The 
intelligence duties for the occupation focused mainly on the Navy and State Department. 
The Marine Corps was eventually assigned the key tasks associated with the U.S. 
occupation, but in the beginning, it was under the command of Navy Rear Admiral 
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William Banks Caperton, who received direction from the U.S. State Department.
66
 The 
occupation force adjusted its gathering methods to the new requirements as the first phase 
changed from an intervention to an occupation. The methods for intelligence gathering 
adjusted according to who was in command and what they viewed their objective to be at 
the moment. Informants within the political elite were used and then abandoned.
67
 
Information from unsubstantiated sources was given credence while attempts to develop 
long-term sources failed.  
The initial phase of the occupation was successful, but it had within it the 
makings of the caco revolt of 1919. Intelligence shortcomings in the first steps of the 
occupation contributed significantly to the initial success of the uprising. Admiral 
Caperton was also much more practiced with diplomatic behavior with the Haitian elite 
than the Marine Corps leadership in Haiti.
68
 The U.S. high command had sent Caperton 
to watch Haitian politics since the revolution of General Sam began back in January 
1915.
69
 Caperton recognized that to achieve his objectives from the State Department, he 
would have to work with the powerful and influential elites. He developed connections 
with the elite to acquire a sympathetic source for political information. Admiral Caperton 
referred to his source as Agent X.
70
 Agent X gave Caperton information about the 
political conditions in Haiti, which gave the U.S. a significant advantage over the 
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fractured Haitian government.
71
 Agent X brought information to Caperton that directly 
affected his choice for a Haitian presidential candidate and gave significant insight into 
the views and desires of the elite who could have had complex designs behind their 
actions.
 72
   
The Haitian political elite had maintained power through the use of intrigue, 
patronage, and violence. Some chose to support the American intervention so they could 
reform that political system, but others wanted to maintain Haiti’s sovereignty. The proud 
history of resistance against foreign and especially white foreign aggression provided a 
powerful counterweight to cooperation. The individual motives within the elite are 
difficult to pin down in the U.S. sources because they were not often thoroughly 
explored. What is clear is that cooperation of the Haitian people improved U.S. military 
chances of success when they thoroughly exploited it.  
 The political and military intelligence gained from Haitian cooperation was 
invaluable in attaining control over the country. Their U.S. counterparts did not fully 
explore the motives of those who collaborated with the occupation after Caperton left 
Haiti. The preservation of U.S. control over the Haitian government relied on 
collaboration, and while forced cooperation was a tool used by the occupation, it was not 
the preferred method.
73
 The lack of assistance meant that the maintenance of the 
collaborators should have been an urgent priority. Therefore the motives behind their 
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collaboration would have been useful for understanding how to keep them friendly. 
 The lack of interest in motives and the eventual breakdown in relations with 
collaborators left the occupation force blind to the realities of their situation. The Marines 
did not attempt to maintain political contacts because they saw their mission in the 
countryside. They focused on the cacos that the Marines viewed as the cause of all of the 
instability in Haiti. The cacos, a long-standing Haitian insurgency, had caused the 
political chaos that now enveloped the country.
74
 Most cacos were poor farmers 
supervised by a chieftain. Chiefs kept the government of Haiti from consolidating power 
throughout the entire country by raiding, preventing any improvement in infrastructure, 
and constantly destabilizing the central government.
75
 Haiti’s small and poorly supplied 
military could not root out the cacos because they used hit-and-run tactics to avoid direct 
engagements unless facing a far weaker force.
76
 These tactics would be used against U.S. 
forces with mixed results throughout the occupation. The challenge of finding the enemy 
became the single most vital intelligence objective of the campaigns.  
 Cacoism also enforced regionalism because it allowed for regional rebel groups 
to operate without federal interference. Cacos became so powerful in Haiti that they 
could replace sitting presidents through violence; presidential aspirants hired them to 
come down into Port au Prince and force out the established ruler.
77
 Cacoism had its roots 
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in maroonage, which were communities of escaped slaves living on the edge of colonial 
Haiti. These groups resisted the central colonial authority and maintained separate 
communities that lived in opposition to the established economic practices.
78
 The tactics 
that these groups used against attempted recapture by colonial authorities very much 
resembled those employed by the cacos. They were guerrilla fighters with a few poor 
weapons but they used numbers and surprise to overcome these disadvantages.
79
 Not 
until the introduction of modern automatic weapons used by occupation forces did the 
age old tactics meet their match. Cacos successfully removed seven presidents from 1911 
and 1915.
80
 It is unknown whether the cacos purposefully made the Haitian political 
system weak or if they achieved it unintentionally, but they were certainly the main cause 
of the political instability. Some Marines came to respect and even like the cacos more 
than the political elites because they felt the cacos had purer motives for resistance.
81
     
In the meantime, the cooperation of officials and government agencies proved 
effective in giving the occupation force control of the major cities in Haiti. The military 
had some cases of resistance, but they were compelled to capitulate by their civilian 
leadership. The prominent future caco leader Charlemagne Peralte was a military 
commander in Leongane where he resisted the U.S. take over.
82
 The Marines and 
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Perlalte’s civilian leadership informed him that he had to surrender his command and his 
garrison. Peralte refused, but the Haitian government removed him from his position and 
placed a more cooperative commander who promptly surrendered the garrison at 
Leogane.
83
  
The U.S. Marines at the beginning in Haiti did not concern themselves very much 
with political or social intelligence because it was not yet operationally significant. They 
were called in to stabilize the country and so viewed their mission as military 
enforcement. Only Rear Admiral Caperton concerned himself with political and social 
intelligence because he had to implement State Department policy. He used the Marines 
as a blunt instrument to enforce some of his political or social maneuvers, but he did not 
keep them informed about his motives.
84
 The Marine’s lack of participation in the social 
and political intelligence during the first phase of the occupation hampered their ability to 
maintain control in the years after Caperton left Haiti.   
The first phase of the occupation focused on reestablishing order in the population 
centers and then consolidating U.S. control. The Marines occupied Port au Prince, 
disarmed the citizens, drove cacos out of the city, and initiated a curfew. U.S. forces used 
probing actions to discover the limits of their local control.
85
 These probing actions also 
helped to familiarize the Marines with the land that they had occupied. At times they used 
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their third party status in regional or national conflicts to avoid confrontation.
86
 As the 
state department and military high command changed the intervention into an occupation, 
Haitian troubles became American ones. This responsibility placed the cacos on a direct 
collision course with the Marines because they were a serious problem for their new 
objective to consolidate centralized power. The cacos had long been an instrument of 
decentralization and regional power struggles; individual cacos were loyal to their 
patrons, but their chiefs or patrons were often bought by the highest bidder.
87
 The 
changing loyalties of the cacos made them a force for political change in Haiti, but also 
made them highly unpredictable. The political aspirant would hire chiefs to gain power 
and promise a payment from the treasury.
88
 The cacos would come down from the rural 
regions of Haiti and take over the major cities to force the sitting president to flee the 
country. The new president would take power, but would immediately have to pay off his 
former allies to satisfy them.
89
 This process repeated itself when chiefs did not receive 
enough payment or were offered more money by another presidential aspirant.
90
 The 
recurring insurrection was one of the main causes for the political instability leading to 
U.S. intervention. To end the cycle of regime change and centralize power in Port au 
Prince, the Marines had to eliminate the cacos. The way to remove the cacos became a 
cause for contention among the leadership of the Marines.  
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Littleton W.T. Waller and Eli Cole were the leaders of the Marine Corps presence 
during the early days of the occupation. Waller was an overly zealous Marine who had 
been accused of and investigated for using extreme measures against the Filipino people 
during the revolt of 1902.
91
 He was later acquitted by a court martial, but his methods did 
not seem to change. Waller’s time in the Philippines had taught him that harsh measures 
against a resistant foe produced results. He allowed his racist views of the Haitian 
population to cloud his judgment, often describing them in disparaging terms.
92
 There are 
no reports of actions he took against civilians in Haiti, but he did not give his caco 
opponents any peace. Cole had a different military experience and opinion on how to deal 
with his opponents. General Lejeune had assigned Col. Cole as the assistant to the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1911 to 1915 and had attended many of the 
newly instituted military schools in the U.S.
93
 Cole later admitted he viewed the cacos as 
patriots and felt that they would have made better allies than the political elites.
94
 Major 
General Smedley Butler served under both members of the occupation leadership.  
Waller, Cole, and Butler agreed that the Haitian elite were corrupt and self-
serving incompetents.
95
 While Caperton developed a political agent within the circles of 
the politically powerful, the Marine Corps leadership ignored or bullied them.
96
 Caperton 
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did not help the Marines develop good relations with the Haitian elite because he used 
them as a blunt instrument to get the dirty jobs done.
97
 He avoided being present at the 
confrontations between the occupation forces and the political elites that had to be 
“brought into line.” Butler and Waller were usually part of the rough implementation of 
the policy, including disbanding the Haitian legislative branch; however, they were not 
privy to the overall strategizing of Caperton with his navy personnel. The lack of 
involvement in overall strategy combined with their personal participation in the rougher 
aspects of the occupation predisposed them to a harsher treatment of the upper classes 
that was worsened by their personal bias. The fractured relationship between the elites 
and the Marine Corps leadership continued to affect the political and social conditions of 
the occupation for several years after the departure of the original leaders.  
The only military actions required after the seizure of population centers in Haiti 
were the rooting out the caco opposition. The initial attempts by the occupation 
leadership under Admiral Caperton to end cacoism relied on bribing chiefs for the 
surrender of weapons and promises to remain peaceful.
98
 The policy failed to pacify the 
entire countryside, but it did reduce the number of arms and groups that needed to be 
engaged. This military pacification was accomplished using basic intelligence methods 
that often caused problems for the Marines. The main intelligence issue was that the 
cacos were on their home turf and smart enough to avoid pitched battle with the better-
armed foe. The Marines used extensive patrols to root out the enemy but were often 
frustrated. Continued failure forced the Marines to try to find information on the cacos.  
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Relying on the local population for intelligence produced pathetically unreliable 
information that had to be communicated either through interpreters or gestures due to a 
lack of language proficiency in Creole.
99
 Some sources were civilians that Marines 
pressed into service as guides, but these frightened individuals were either uninformed or 
poorly motivated to provide useful geographic intelligence.
100
 Eventually, the Marines 
were able to piece together information given by sources that led them to an important 
engagement at Fort Riviere where Smedley Butler led his men into a twenty-minute 
melee that ended in the deaths of fifty-one cacos.
101
 While this was not the final battle in 
the bush, it was a significant moment in the minds of the Marines and their foes. 
Resistance continued on but lacked direction or staying power.  
The problems with the relationship between the Marine Corps and the Haitian 
elite began to hamper the occupation when the naval leadership left. Previously, some of 
the elites had been instrumental in the success of the occupation, but as relations soured, 
they began to resist.  Not long after instructions from the State Department ceased and the 
Marines were left on their own to prosecute the occupation did the lack of direction 
become apparent. The agent that had helped Caperton to navigate the intricacies of the 
Haitian political system was no longer mentioned either in personal sources or official 
government records following Caperton’s departure. It is unknown whether Caperton 
purposefully did not mention his source or if the Marine Corps leadership simply ignored 
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it, but now those in charge of the occupation were on the wrong footing in unfamiliar 
territory and bereft of any guide. This development allowed for the relationship between 
the forceful Marines and the subtle Haitian elite to deteriorate rapidly. Problems of race, 
class, and nationalism combined to add insult to injury.  
The relationship between the poorer people of Haiti and the occupation force was 
complex. The Haitian poor were often highly adaptable to the changing governments of 
their island nation, but the occupation of a foreign power provided a unique challenge to 
their adaptability. The people now faced an occupation by individuals that could not 
speak their native tongue and did not understand their cultural systems.
102
 Those who 
chose not to join with the caco groups in the wilderness had to decide whether to resist, 
wait for an eventual withdrawal, or help the invader. The majority simply chose to wait it 
out and learned to deal with the temporary annoyance of a foreign occupation. This group 
did, at times, take sides through passive resistance or even brief active participation, but 
they largely allowed the occupation to play out.  The next largest group was those that 
chose to resist in the spirit of their brave ancestors who had struggled against slavery and 
foreign incursions.
103
 The final smallest group decided to support the occupation and 
played a major role in its successes. These individuals were diversely motivated to join 
the American cause, arriving with their ideas of what the occupation should accomplish. 
Some of them would become vital intelligence sources and even double agents for the 
American Marines in Haiti. They provided intelligence that thwarted major attacks, 
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informed on the disposition of caco forces, and even brought down their leaders.  
The lack of respect for the caco fighters was one of the most prominent problems 
that the Marines faced with intelligence work. The Marines did not consider the cacos a 
military foe but, rather, as bandits, and this may have helped the Marines to consider 
them less of a threat (this underestimation affected how they operated against their 
enemy, especially how they gathered intelligence). The cacos did not have real weapons 
but relied on old breach loading rifles for which they often had the wrong caliber of 
ammunition.
104
 They made up for the caliber difference by strapping some leather around 
the cartridge to enlarge it in the barrel.
105
 The modified ammunition made their fire 
extremely inaccurate and problematic for sniping or ambushes, but the cacos were not 
deficient in courage or cunning. The Marines even referred to patrols as hunts and cacos 
as apes.
106
  
The complex relations between all classes of Haitian people and their occupiers 
placed military intelligence in a dangerous situation. The trouble for Marines was to 
determine whether or not the information they received from Haitian sources was valid. 
Early in the campaign, there were many Haitians that came forward to offer contradictory 
information. Before the attack on Fort Riviere, the Marines happened upon a Haitian man 
and forced him to provide the location of the fort.  Butler later accused this source of 
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having provided information that was meant to trap the Marines.
107
  
Cole and Waller represented the two plans to deal with the remaining cacos in the 
countryside after the Marines secured the main towns of Haiti. Cole called for paying the 
caco chiefs to avoid bloodshed and gain allies in rural Haiti.
108
 Opposed to the plan was 
Colonel Littleton Waller, who saw the violent subjugation of the cacos as the only 
permanent solution to the chronic political instability in Haiti.
109
 The Marines ended up 
combining the two approaches, which left them vulnerable to the problems of both. The 
U.S. extended an olive branch to the caco chiefs allowing them to turn in their arms and 
those of their comrades for bounties. The problems that came from these “disarmed” 
cacos during the revolt of 1919 proved that they had not fully given in to the U.S. 
occupation scheme. The Marines hunted down the cacos who did not comply. Several 
chieftains assisted from the start, but many chose to resist. Many of the caco leaders had 
been unchallenged for years and understood that their networks of loyal Haitians would 
be difficult for a foreign invader to convert. They also knew that the poor infrastructure 
and difficult terrain would be to their advantage against the unguided U.S. Marines. 
Many of the main roads that connected the major cities of Haiti had not been well 
maintained.
110
 The intelligence challenges to the Marines were severe, but they were able 
to implement some methods that had worked in other counterinsurgency conflicts. 
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The missions to destroy the cacos that had not sold their guns to the Marines were 
tactically successful but provided few strategic results. The intelligence collected during 
the missions was directly connected to the prosecution of the tactical goals and were, 
therefore, not well recorded for later use.  There was little or no attempt to establish 
permanent sources of intelligence in areas where the caco presence was strongest, and the 
Marines did not diligently record the names of their sources that had given them good 
information. The Marines focused on destroying the strongholds of their enemies and that 
goal they achieved very well.
111
 The forts that had for years been under the control of the 
caco rebels fell in rapid succession to a determined and well-armed adversary. Even 
though the massive hilltop fortresses of the countryside were hard to locate due to the 
poor maps and lack of valuable sources, nevertheless the Marines eventually stumbled 
into them. The intelligence methods they used to make contact with the enemy were large 
patrols, local guides, and informants. These sources proved dubious and even resulted in 
some near military disasters.
112
 Taking the series of caco-held forts in the interior was an 
important step toward ending their hold on the countryside. It was also an attempt to 
eliminate weapons caches.   
Col. Waller assigned Butler and Cole to the northern military district of Haiti to 
begin the hunt for cacos in the interior.
113
 First, they established control in Cap Haitian on 
the north coast. Haitian government officials handed control of Cap Haitian over to the 
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Marines who landed unopposed from the sea.
114
 After a few days of sending out 
intermittent patrols of varying sizes, he decided to take on the cacos directly. Butler 
understood that the cacos would continue to hold the initiative until he could make direct 
contact with their forces. The cacos used the old forts as strongholds in the north; Waller 
planned to take them out to break caco resistance. Butler used large long-range patrols to 
disrupt the caco rebels’ hold on the countryside and to break up troop concentrations.115 
These excursions would have been able to achieve results if they had first sought out 
specific intelligence on their enemies before the operations began. They seemed to know 
the general locations of the main forts in the region, but they lacked several key details 
about their enemies that could have been useful. There were many more improvised forts 
in the area than they expected and as they cut through the countryside, the Marines 
remained under constant fire during their several days of marching.
116
  The cacos did not 
often stand and fight, even in their strongholds. The Marines could not fully trap the 
cacos in their forts because of their lack of geographic intelligence. Their inadequate 
preparation allowed the cacos to avoid destruction during the early days of the occupation 
which later came back to haunt the Marines in 1919.  
The first fort to fall to Butler’s Marines was Fort Dipitie on October 24, 1915. 
They stumbled into a night ambush but recovered and charged the defense at daybreak.
117
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Next, Fort Capois fell on November 8, but the majority of the garrison escaped due to 
intelligence failures.
118
 The last to be taken was Fort Riviere on November 17, which 
signaled the beginning of the end of the first phase of Marine involvement in Haiti. 
Knocking out the forts was an important Marine objective because these strongholds 
often held many of the weapons the cacos hoarded until they decided to attack. The 
Marines believed that if they could track down the major stashes of arms, the cacos 
would cease resisting or at least would be severely hampered. The timeline of the fall of 
the forts makes the campaign in Haiti appear very simple and well executed, but in 
reality, these operations suffered from intelligence weaknesses.  
Fort Dipitie was a small, well-defended fortification making its destruction 
anything but smooth. The target that the Marines sought when they destroyed Fort Dipitie 
was Fort Capois.
119
 The Americans in northern Haiti did not report how they discovered 
that Fort Capois existed, but somehow they heard that it was in the interior and that it was 
a staging area for caco raids into Marine-controlled regions. The men under Smedley 
Butler’s command went on horseback to find the fort. Butler later described the one map 
he had as valueless, but at the same time, he failed to procure a guide before he loped off 
into the countryside.
120
 This failure to gain specific intelligence before going to an 
unknown location in unfamiliar territory could have been a military disaster. Butler had 
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previously relied on fallen orange peels from the cacos to track them, but on this 
expedition, he could find none.
121
 He eventually found a lone Haitian man of fighting age 
in the path of the patrol. His location should have been suspect, but instead, the Haitian 
was immediately pressed into service to locate the elusive Fort Capois.
122
 Interestingly 
this source of intelligence was not mentioned in the after-action report that Butler 
submitted, but he refers to the source in his memoir, Old Gimlet Eye.
123
 It may be 
because he later discovered his guide was a caco agent that betrayed the Marines to an 
ambush.
124
  
Butler mentions in his report that as they crossed a river, four hundred cacos fired 
on them from three sides taking the Marines completely by surprise.
125
Worse still, the 
unit’s machine gun was lost in the river as the horse carrying it was shot during the 
crossing. Luckily for Butler and his men, Sergeant Dan Daley bravely retrieved the gun 
in the river, but the Marines remained under fire the rest of the night by an elusive 
enemy.
126
 When daylight broke, the machine gun reversed the Marines’ fortunes and 
allowed them to pursue their assailants. The cacos had successfully provided misleading 
intelligence that landed the Marines in a tight spot. The cacos did not kill anyone, and 
Fort Dipitie turned out to be just up the hill from where the Marines were attempting to 
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cross the stream. Lieutenants Upshur and Ostermann charged up the hill, scattering the 
cacos and destroying the fort.
127
 The Marines burned the fort along with several huts 
nearby to ensure its continued disuse. Marines walked into this ambush because of 
listening to corrupted intelligence. The action was considered highly successful, but 
Butler did not inform his superiors about how his intelligence failure had caused the 
ambush that compromised his command’s operational security.128 The courage and far 
superior firepower of the Marines allowed them to extricate themselves from what could 
have been a dangerous tactical situation.    
During Butler’s patrol, he had seen Fort Capois in the distance and reported its 
position to Waller who gave him permission to attack, but it was not a total success since 
Butler once again failed to gain sufficient intelligence about his target. Luckily he knew 
the fort’s location because he had seen it, but he did not fully reconnoiter the area before 
his attack.
129
 Butler’s intelligence gap may have been because he feared his presence in 
the area was already known. He failed to cover all of the escape routes, allowing the bulk 
of the garrison to flee.
130
 Four columns approached the fort in an attempt to surround the 
hill, but they had not gained sufficient intelligence about the trails leading to the top. Two 
columns finally arrived at the same time near the summit, but the other two columns were 
still two hours off.
131
 Overall the objective to take out the fort was achieved, but the 
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former occupants escaped due to an intelligence failure. As aforementioned, an 
immediate attack may have been the only course of action open to Butler under the 
circumstances.  
Fort Riviere was the final and most difficult challenge of this aggressive 
campaign in northern Haiti. It had been built by the French during the early 19
th
 century 
and was widely considered impregnable by the local population due to its high stone 
walls and construction on a large hill that had a commanding view of the area. One of the 
local caco generals, Josefette, held it with a huge band of his men.
132
 Colonel Cole sent a 
reconnoitering party to examine the defenses and gain information as to how to approach 
the hilltop fortress.
133
 Cole employed several larger columns to gather intelligence on the 
fort, which cacos saw from their advantageous position.
134
 The enemy chose to stay and 
fight because they considered their position unassailable. The attack on Fort Riviere was 
one of the few times that large patrols gathered valuable, actionable intelligence because 
of caco tactical withdrawals. Cole and several of his staff considered an attack strategy 
that used the field artillery in conjunction with an overwhelming assault force to take the 
fort.
135
 Smedley Butler, with the support of Col. Waller, chose a frontal assault without 
waiting for the field artillery to arrive.  Col. Cole outlined a plan that called for four 
separate company-strength columns to push into the valley around Fort Riviere and drive 
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the cacos into the fort, followed by a four-pronged assault on the heights; it was a simple 
plan of action.
136
 His involvement in the last two serious engagements with the cacos had 
convinced him that his Marines could use superior firepower to overwhelm the more 
numerous enemy forces. Butler chose one hundred men for the assault and set off for the 
fort.  
When Butler’s Marines arrived at the foot of the mountain of Fort Riviere several 
Marine patrols had already reconnoitered and softened up the position by driving the 
cacos out of the valley areas.
137
 Cole had ordered several Marine detachments to scour 
the area around Grande Riviere since Oct. 22, 1915.
138
 They searched for any 
concentrations of cacos, but they knew of two major forts in the region, Fort Capois, and 
Fort Riviere.
139
 The detachments used guides from the local population and examined 
every trail they came upon in the Fort Riviere region. Cole had led a systematic search in 
known caco territory that eventually narrowed down the location of the enemy. His 
search for intelligence appears in direct contrast to the haphazard Butler patrol that found 
Fort Capois. Both operations found their objective, but the Marines took Fort Riviere 
with its garrison intact which meant a complete victory. 
 Cole achieved success because of the intelligence that he doggedly gained 
through long and challenging patrolling. Cole’s recon found Fort Riviere and then Cole 
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used his separate companies to drive the cacos toward the fort where he cut off any 
escape routes.
140
 The cacos were now bottled up in Fort Riviere, giving Butler the edge 
he needed. He took his one hundred hand-picked men and divided them into sections for 
the attack. The three companies started up their separate trails at the same time; the first 
company began at Grande Riviere, the second company from Bahon, and the last 
company from San Rafael.
141
 The attack began at a preselected time and when Butler 
blew his whistle the men around him charged the hill.
142
 The Marines had not thoroughly 
reconnoitered the other sections of the steep trail on the mountain where the other 
companies were supposed to advance. The two companies, unable to advance, provided 
suppressing fire that allowed Butler’s section from San Rafael to move forward without 
taking casualties.
143
 Butler ensured increased covering fire by placing two machine guns 
under one of his Marines named Marston to shield the charge.
144
 The accurate cover fire 
gave the Americans a decisive advantage over the inaccurate rifles of the cacos on the 
ramparts. The cacos held their ground against the heavy fire and did everything they 
could to stop the stubborn assault. The only injury occurred when a caco, while 
desperately fighting to hold the fort, hit a Marine in the face with a rock.
145
 Butler and his 
men finally made it to the wall but found there was only one way into the fort by an old 
drain culvert, which led directly into the inner courtyard. Butler admitted, years later, that 
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he felt great fear at the prospect of entering into the culvert but two of his men, Iam and 
Gross, rushed in.
146
 Butler followed them closely before they burst into the fort’s 
courtyard in the midst of a vast number of enemy fighters. Several cacos fell dead as 
Butler and his men fired into them at close range. They then grappled hand-to-hand for 
fifteen minutes. The last of the cacos tried to flee by jumping over the ramparts of the fort 
but were shot down by automatic fire covering the walls. The engagement was a 
complete success.
147
 The first campaign against the cacos of Haiti did not end directly 
after the fall of the fort, but the resistance in the northern part of Haiti petered out.  
The fort campaign illustrates the troubles the Marines had in gathering 
intelligence in a region that was hostile. The tools that they had at their disposal did not 
allow them to cover many miles efficiently and they did not have adequate maps to help 
them navigate in unfamiliar territory. The caco rebels wisely chose to constantly harass 
their enemy as they patrolled, forcing the Marines to rely on large recon patrols that were 
ineffective at gathering actionable intelligence. Big patrols could not provide intelligence 
because the cacos could see them easily and simply move to an uncompromised area. The 
success of the attack on Fort Dipitie occurred because the cacos allowed the Marines to 
find them. The well-executed ambush could not provide a victory because of the 
technological and armament advantage of the Marines. The modified caco rifles produced 
an extremely inaccurate fire that had little effect on the Marines. The cacos had used 
massive amounts of poorly aimed fire to break up enemy formations and then they would 
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charge them with improvised arms to overwhelm their enemy. The tactic had worked 
successfully for many years against foreign and local forces. The superior Marine 
firepower, which was more accurate, proved decisive in keeping the cacos from closing 
in for hand-to-hand combat.
148
 Later, the attack on Fort Capois showed that the cacos 
understood that a direct confrontation against the superior arms and training of the 
Marines was folly. Retreat did, however, allow them to keep the majority of their forces 
intact for future campaigns. The deficiency of intelligence on the enemy positions proved 
problematic and even dangerous. The few times the Marines gathered sufficient 
intelligence before attacks helped them capitalize on their successes. The Marines 
temporarily broke the caco threat with the fort capturing campaign in northern Haiti, but 
the threat would quickly rise again when given a cause in 1919.  
The next campaign had its seeds in the intelligence failures of the first, but for the 
time being the cacos in Haiti melted back into the community. The Marines could not 
document established connections for the long term. Many of the Haitians who provided 
intelligence on the forts lived in rural communities and were too far away to be within the 
limits of the occupation’s control. The distance from the widely dispersed garrisons in the 
countryside made any possible network difficult to maintain or even establish. The 
remaining cacos in the countryside could terrorize anyone they thought was working for 
the occupation while it was impossible to protect them if they lived outside of the 
garrison towns. The changing mission or objectives multiplied this problem. The 
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intelligence that once mattered most became obsolete when the Marines changed their 
aims. The shifting intelligence requirements of the few sources the Marines maintained 
could not meet the needs for the first caco campaign; the misdirected intelligence 
objectives would create many of the problems that allowed the second caco campaign to 
occur.  
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CHAPTER III 
INTER-VIOLENCE PERIOD 1916-1919 
While the standard view that the corvée system was responsible for the caco 
revolt is accurate, it does not explain why the Haitian people confronted the Marine 
Corps and its allies and effectively blindsided the Marines. The failure of Marine Corps 
leadership to keep its finger on the pulse of the political and social situation in Haiti 
contributed meaningfully to the rise of the revolt, which nearly succeeded because the 
Marines chose to follow an incorrect intelligence priority. There is no evidence that 
Marines serving there received any training in political or social analysis, but they were 
still expected to maintain political and social order. Many of them were also given 
oversight over political organizations without much of an understanding of how they 
functioned.
149
 Further, there was no language requirement for those given political 
responsibilities in Haiti.
150
 The lack of systemized forms for intelligence reports meant 
that many lacked pertinent details and passed on useless information. The unmet need for 
consistent guidance from the State Department resulted in the Marines looking to the 
Haitian-American Treaty of 1916 for strategic direction and then discerning how to 
implement a general policy in specific circumstances. A shift in operational objectives in 
response to perceived threats caused significant intelligence failures. The Marines sought 
information about a foreign threat and allowed a local insurgency to flare up. The 
traditional view that the corvée system caused the caco revolt of 1919 remains an 
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important explanation, but several military intelligence failures allowed Haitian rebels to 
operate without disruption, giving the rebellion a head start.   
The Marine Corps command in Haiti split in early 1916 with the formation of 
Gendarmerie d`Haiti. The first group, led at the beginning by Col Butler, was assigned to 
train and supervise this new military police organization.
151
 The second group remained 
as a Marine Corps brigade stationed in Port au Prince under the command of Col. Cole. 
The Gendarmerie d'Haiti took control of the countryside and the majority of the treaty 
duties while the brigade in Port au Prince supported the gendarmerie when attacked.
152
 
The majority of the field intelligence work was done by those serving in the native forces 
because they were the ones in direct contact with the population, but the brigade 
eventually maintained intelligence networks and surveillance on political conditions in 
Port au Prince. The Gendarmerie d’Haiti had the natural advantage of native Haitian 
members that could give geographic, social, and military intelligence. The Marines did 
not initially exploit this resource, but when they eventually did the results were 
impressive.   
Violence in Haiti diminished rapidly from the start of 1916 as the cacos were 
hunted down or chose to accept bribes to lay down their arms. As a response, the U.S. 
State Department switched the Marines’ mission from guerrilla fighters to instruments of 
political oversight. The Marine brigade stationed in Port au Prince maintained order and 
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functioned as a reserve force for the police force.  The Treaty of 1916 assigned the 
Marine-trained Gendarmerierie d’Haiti to keep order in the countryside, improve 
infrastructure, and carry out the orders of the client government; it patrolled for cacos, led 
work crews, and enforced Haitian local law.
153
 The Marines that officered the 
Gendarmerie drew their pay directly from the Haitian government and the treaty 
ostensibly placed them under the command of the President of Haiti, but they remained 
under the actual direction of the U.S. Marine Corps.
154
 The Marines working there stayed 
in the field with military objectives, but they also had oversight of the local governments. 
The Haitians in the gendarmerie came mostly from the lower classes.
155
 Only a few were 
elites who joined the occupation police, and most of them found their treatment 
intolerable because the Marines did not allow them the privileges of their station.
156
 
Many elites also recognized that the Americans would eventually leave and if they 
“threw in” with the occupation they would have little chance at political support after 
they left.  
Col. Littleton Waller assigned Maj. Smedley Butler to “recruit, instruct, organize, 
and equip… the constabulary of Haiti.”157 Butler dove into the project and became a 
powerful advocate for State Department objectives itemized in the Treaty of 1916.
158
 He 
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wrote many letters to his father’s fellow congressmen inviting them to visit Haiti and to 
support the work the Marines were doing there. In a letter to House Minority Leader, 
James Robert Mann, Butler outlined the essential nature of the American mission in 
Haiti, “The people have been much oppressed by their former dishonest officials through 
an illegal squeeze system, which we have put an absolute stop to. The treaty provides, 
and we hope it will come true, that in a few years all of us will be able to leave Haiti and 
the constabulary entirely officered by their people, but at present, owing to their 
traditions and the previous bad government, we are certain that this is impracticable.”159 
Butler’s letters all speak of exterminating corruption and improving the lives of the poor 
classes. From these letters and his writings of Haiti, it is evident that he genuinely cared 
for those he referred to as the “shoeless classes.”160 Butler described a system of 
corruption in Haiti in his letter to Congressman Mann in which he associated exploitation 
(as well as all of Haiti’s other chronic problems) with the elites.   
 Butler’s feelings towards the powerful of Haiti compounded by the lopsided 
demographic of poorer Haitians in the gendarmerie created some serious challenges for 
the occupation. His entire command received pay, and in theory, orders directly from the 
client-government of President Dartiguenave but in reality, they focused on U.S. treaty 
objectives. The Gendarmerierie d’Haiti was intended to be the source of centralized 
power after the occupation left, but it nearly left out an important part of the demographic 
picture. A natural hostility developed between the elites and the police that negatively 
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affected the way they dealt with one another.
161
 The Haitian political elite eventually shut 
themselves off from the representatives of the occupation to defend themselves from 
further erosion to their political position. 
 Political oversight established by the Treaty of 1916 further hampered relations 
between the ruling elite and the occupation force. A young Marine NCO had the 
authority to override any government official within his jurisdiction and was the 
paymaster for all civil servants.
162
 This tremendous power over the more experienced 
native officials by young foreigners caused a rapid reduction in support and made it 
difficult to inspire cooperation from the local government.  The oversight held by 
American Marines over experienced Haitian politicians seemed to validate some 
commonly held views of American superiority. The Marines were not disciplined under 
Haitian law but had U.S. Naval trials if they broke with military standards.
163
 This gave 
the Americans in remote parishes the appearance of legal impunity that may have 
contributed to the rise of abuses before the congressional investigation.  
 The widely accepted cause of tensions between Americans and Haitians was the 
use of the corvée system. The corvée system was a Haitian law that allowed the poor to 
pay their taxes through labor. The French had used it during the 18
th
 century to improve 
their roads, and the Marines figured it was a cheap way to get work done.
164
 The biggest 
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problem with using the corvée system was that it was as close to slavery without actually 
being slavery as it could possibly be. Some road detachments forced Haitians into corvée 
service without notice; they were guarded by occupation forces, and received no pay.
165
 
The problem was compounded by the numerous reports of mistreatment and abuses of 
workers created a dangerous public relations disaster. Some workers were chained, and 
others were kept well over the time limit established by law, but even if the occupation 
forces had not mistreated the corvée workers, the system was still a powerfully misguided 
solution for their country. 
166
 
Haitians had fought several bloody wars to gain and then maintain their freedom 
from slavery. Haitians quickly recognized that a white man forcing their countrymen to 
labor without pay was an affront to all they had fought for throughout their history. The 
occupation tried to gain allies by reforming corrupt government institutions and 
improving internal infrastructure, but none of that mattered if it was at the cost of 
injustice. Somehow the Marines did not consider the problematic nature of an American 
run corvée system. Their failure to understand the people they came to serve cost them 
lots of support and allowed the caco rebellion to take on a nationalistic stance. The caco 
rebellion of 1919 was different from the previous self-serving regime-changes 
perpetrated in an earlier year. Young, idealistic Haitians joined the struggle because they 
saw the occupation as a clear violation of their national sovereignty and cultural 
dignity.
167
  The nationalist fervor made it more like a revolution than a mere rebellion; 
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therefore, it was much harder to put down.  
Marines were given little training in maintaining political and social control over 
civilian populations. The tools the Marines had at their disposal for gathering political or 
social intelligence had severe limitations. They had to find a way to avoid hurting the 
pride of the Haitian elites while still reforming their government. The poor had to be 
taxed and helped, but occupation forces also had to avoid arousing deep cultural fears of 
white oppression. Many Marines did not attempt to toe this tough line, but those that did 
found it difficult.  
Cultural misunderstandings and prejudice put pro-occupation Haitians in an 
impossible position that caused many to shift allegiance. Butler’s instructions to the far-
flung Marines commanding the Gendarmerie d`Haiti garrisons consisted of twenty 
points.
168
 These points included care for uniform, instruction on how to behave towards 
local political officials, and how they should treat prisoners.
169
 Most of the instruction 
discusses the last problem and attempts to instruct the Marines on not using excessive 
force.
170
 This document illustrates that constabulary duty was a difficult shift in the job 
description for the Marines. They had been trained to kill without hesitation, and now 
they were being told that they could only use violence as a last resort or “when their life 
was in peril.”171 During the investigation done by the U.S. Congress in 1921-22, Haitian 
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citizens accused Marines of unlawful executions, random violence against civilians, and 
unjustified arrests. The order by Butler seems to confirm this problem because of its 
thoroughness in addressing this issue. Butler did not take the time to describe how the 
Marines should gather social, political, or even military intelligence for those in charge of 
garrison units. Instead, he tried to combat the problem of abuses against the civilian 
population. However, the failure to resolve the abuses allowed resentment to grow among 
all levels of society in Haiti. The lack of intelligence instruction and direction gave that 
growing sentiment the opportunity to fester unchecked.  
While the use of the corvée system played a major role in increasing tensions 
between the American occupation forces and native Haitians, the lack of well-focused 
military intelligence gave the Haitians a better chance of success. One of the greatest 
weaknesses of the occupation’s intelligence strategy was its focus on foreign threats. U.S. 
strategic thought in the Caribbean revolved around the Monroe Doctrine and protecting 
the Panama Canal.
172
 The Monroe Doctrine guaranteed the exclusion of European forces 
from the Americas. When the U.S. completed the Panama Canal in 1914, it complicated 
U.S. foreign policy by requiring its protection and the vital routes to it.
173
 These concerns 
justified the occupation of Haiti and framed how the Marines approached their 
intelligence mission. Strategic concerns and personal concerns were equally responsible 
for the perception of the German threat. The initial American view of the war in Europe 
suggested that it was not their problem. The subtle shift towards supporting and then 
joining the Allies against the Central Powers occurred over several years. The major 
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factors that caused this change included unrestricted submarine warfare, German 
subversion, and growing U.S. commercial connections to the Allies. As the general 
public began to see Germany as a danger to the U.S., the military naturally began to take 
any possible German threat seriously.  
The Marines occupying Haiti were not immune to this shift, which only worsened 
with U.S. entry into WWI. The feeling was exacerbated by how many Marines felt that 
their skills and efforts were wasted on a sideshow campaign.
174
 Once internal control was 
established in Haiti, and the gendarmerie took on the countryside responsibilities, the 
Marines cast about looking for a purpose in Haiti. Many of them saw the war in Europe 
as the main theater of operations even before the Americans became involved. U.S. 
strategic concerns about German aggression in the Caribbean influenced the Marines’ 
belief that there might be an incursion. Smedley Butler, once a committed believer in the 
U.S. mission in Haiti, now complained bitterly about the uselessness of his work in 
Haiti.
175
 Butler was not the only Marine spoiling to fight the Germans, but his position as 
commander of the gendarmerie gave him influence among his men. Many of the Marines 
serving in the Gendarmerierie d’Haiti agreed with Butler, but even if some of them did 
not, they were obliged to seek intelligence on German activities in Haiti. Col Cole, the 
commander of the Marine Brigade in Port au Prince, also took the German threat very 
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seriously.
176
  
The danger of a German invasion in the Caribbean during World War I seems 
minimal in retrospect, but at the time the threat seemed very real. The German Reich had 
been expanding its influence aggressively since its adoption of Weltpolitik in 1891, and 
there was a minority of German merchants in Haiti with significant impact. The British 
blockade of the German armada limited the possibility of German troops making it to 
Haiti. The minor German squadrons of pocket battleships let loose in the Mediterranean, 
and the Pacific could have caused damage to the ports of Haiti, but did not as they caused 
havoc elsewhere before the British tracked them down. The U-Deutschland, a specialized 
merchant submarine, was big enough to carry much more than a conventional submarine 
and had been created specifically to cross the Atlantic.
177
 This vessel did make voyages 
past the British blockade to arrive in the United States but as relations between Germany 
and the U.S. deteriorated, the trading missions ceased.
178
 The U-Deutschland, in theory, 
could have landed a limited German force in Haiti by passing underneath the British 
blockade. None of this occurred, but Germans in other sections of the world attempted to 
foment rebellion, much as Germans in German Southwest Africa convinced Boers in 
British South Africa to revolt for the second time in recent history. They also convinced 
their Ottoman allies to declare a jihad against the Entente powers hoping to start revolts 
in India, North Africa, and Southern Russia. The Germans provided the guns used by the 
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Easter Rising in Ireland, 1916.
179
 Lieutenant Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck ran 
a guerrilla war in German East Africa that lasted longer than the combat on the Western 
Front.
180
 World War I did not seem to have a geographical limit, and Haiti appeared to be 
a vulnerable target for the ambitious German forces. Many Marines saw this vast and 
aggressive power as the greatest threat to their control of Haiti, which played a crucial 
role in how they pursued intelligence work.  
Much of the intelligence gathered after April 1917, when the U.S. entered WWI, 
focused on the German threat. The Germans in Haiti were cataloged and watched until 
the U.S. officials deported them in 1919.
181
 In the meantime, many were imprisoned or 
placed under house arrest. The harshness of their treatment stemmed from the belief that 
the Germans actively supported and inflamed the caco revolt. There has never been a 
thorough investigation of whether there was much German support for the revolt of 1919 
but the sources describing the revolt hold that there was little possibility or need for 
German support.
182
  
The lack of focus on the real danger unfolding in Haiti remained unknown until it 
had grown to enough strength to challenge the occupation forces directly. Part of the 
problem stemmed from a lack of systemization for intelligence reports. The reporting 
system for intelligence reports changed several times during the occupation, but during 
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the first few years, many of the reports were inconsistent. Haiti had been divided into 
three military districts each having a command structure that reported to the main 
occupation leaders in Port au Prince.
183
 By the early twenties the reports were written 
weekly, but before that, they could be monthly or even annually. There was not a 
consistent format for reports during the early part of the occupation, which meant that 
each commander would report whatever seemed interesting in a letter. Later, as the 
reports became formalized, there were specific subheadings for the different aspects of 
the intelligence that was required by the high command. Those subheadings showed the 
garrison commanders exactly the type of information for which they should seek and 
helped them inform their high command specifically about those issues. The lack of 
structure and inconsistency of the reporting, before the intelligence reform in the nineteen 
twenties, meant that unless a Marine had been specifically trained to report on the 
political, social, and military conditions of his district, his information was often useless.  
Some of the technology pioneered during the early years of World War I was 
available to the Marines in Haiti, but it was often not fully exploited. The airplane was 
the most notable example. The occupation forces in Haiti used airplanes as transportation 
and delivery mechanisms.
184
 The flight logs of several Marine pilots in Haiti from 1916 
to 1918 show that they did not engage in intelligence work.
185
 The reasons for this may 
have been two-fold. First, the jungle made aerial intelligence tough to ascertain, and 
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second, the Marines were not concerned about a possible caco uprising. Other 
technologies were not as useful against a guerrilla force because they focused on 
communications. The Haitian fighters had been wise in choosing to employ an ancient 
communication method using drums and conch shells to pass information right over the 
heads of the Marines.
186
 Only with the use of double agents could these messages be 
deciphered and due to a lack of trust, the gendarmerie did not employ double agents until 
the revolt was in full swing.  
The tension between the occupation forces and the Haitian population was born 
out of cultural misunderstanding. The U.S. Marines did not make serious attempts at 
understanding or accommodating Haitian society. The use of the corvée system was an 
important symbol of the overall problems that the occupation faced.  A lack of focused 
intelligence and poor reporting methods combined to keep the Marine high command in 
Haiti ignorant of the growing revolt in 1918. The Marines in Haiti did learn a great deal 
from their lapse in military intelligence, and they would implement those lessons 
throughout the rest of their time in Haiti. Their improvements would prove decisive in 
putting down the revolt of 1919 and maintaining order until the withdrawal of 1934.   
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CACO REVOLT OF 1919 
The Caco Revolt of 1919 gave the Marines in Haiti the perfect opportunity to 
learn from their previous intelligence missteps. World War I ended on November 11, 
1918, providing Haitian occupation forces better focus on the problems affecting 
stability. The technologies used and techniques learned on the battlefields of France also 
gave the Marines an advantage over the isolated caco forces. New leadership with 
military intelligence experience, namely John H. Russell, also came to Haiti in early 1919 
and oversaw the creation of a more efficient method of communicating intelligence 
learned in the field. The introduction of intelligence staff officers changed the 
intelligence reporting process, provided systematic analysis, and distributed information 
to those that needed it. Men outside of the leadership also contributed significant military 
intelligence victories that changed the course of the conflict. Their contributions included 
the use of civilian militia to gather intelligence and participate in patrolling. Occupation 
forces made substantial changes as to how they practiced military intelligence and sealed 
the fate of the caco revolt.  
World War I ended in November 1918, allowing Marine Corps leadership along 
with other U.S. forces to begin demobilizing the majority of its troops. One of the few 
opportunities left for ambitious Marines searching combat duty service in Haiti. The 
policy that allowed enlisted Marines to serve as officers in the gendarmerie enticed those 
in the Corps that hoped to get a little extra money more importantly; they could get real 
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combat leadership experience that would help them advance in military rank.
187
 The 
occupation of Haiti was now one of the only places a Marine could continue to render 
military service to his country outside of the United States. Service there became valuable 
again and allowed the Marines to reorient their intelligence priorities. This shift did not 
occur automatically, but the rise of Charlemagne Peralte gave the occupation forces the 
needed push to refocus on the mission at hand. Peralte led the most effective resistance 
movement in Haiti from 1918 until his assassination in 1919.  
The caco revolt was born out of Haitian frustrations with the U.S. occupation and 
the Haitian client-government. The U.S. military leadership chose not to prioritize 
domestic intelligence so the source of mounting frustration remained unknown. The 
corvée system showed Haitians that the Americans were only there to take advantage of 
natural resources and enslave them. Communication problems created by language 
barriers and cultural misunderstanding made the Haitian people feel alienated.
188
 The 
increasing centralization under the direction of the foreign power made their future 
oppression clear. The U.S.-backed authorities enslaved Haitian citizens as road workers, 
which exacerbated regional jealousies and tarnished national pride. Caco fighters 
experienced in combating government forces believed that a short, sharp, overwhelming 
assault on centers of power could topple an unpopular regime. This method had worked 
for them many times, and they expected to be able to do the same to the new central 
power. The caco method required scores of troops and local support, both of which 
                                                 
187
 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1995), 88. 
188
 Ibid., 90. 
65 
 
 
 
Peralte seemed sure to have, but the new government enemy was not subject to popular 
support as had been the previous ones. The Haitian client-government remained in power 
not because of regional or national support but through the force of U.S. arms. Peralte 
understood this, which is why he declared a national rather than regional war against the 
occupation to drive the invaders into the sea.
189
 Peralte did not fully succeed in his vision 
of creating a national resistance, but he did successfully inflame the northern and central 
sections of Haiti. Peralte used agents to gather intelligence about the sizes and disposition 
of the gendarmerie garrisons in each town in northern Haiti.
190
 
A young minor Haitian elite named Charlemagne Peralte enflamed a revolt in 
central Haiti and allied with the cacos of the north.  Peralte had military experience and a 
history of resisting the American occupation, and resisted surrendering his command at 
the beginning of the occupation only to be fired by the client-government for his 
loyalty.
191
 Marines later imprisoned Peralte for suspicion of participation in a robbery of 
the government paymaster at Hinche.
192
 Peralte, a member of the rural elite that was both 
educated and experienced in military administration, turned out to be an exceptional 
adversary for occupying forces in Haiti. The humiliation he experienced at the hands of 
the U.S.-backed forces gave him all the motivation he needed to fight the occupation until 
his death. He inflamed the countryside to widespread revolt and deftly fought off 
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attempts to subdue his troops. Many give Peralte the majority of the credit for inspiring a 
strong resistance to the U.S. occupation.
193
 
The cacos had to rely on superior numbers and their knowledge of the countryside 
to overcome their disadvantages.  Courageous but suicidal machete charges could not 
remain the only method of attack. Haitians had to use caution to avoid the tragic failures 
of the last campaign. If the cacos could not completely surprise their enemy, the Marines 
mowed them down with overwhelming firepower. Charlemagne Peralte understood this 
and avoided pitched battles in daylight and only attacked at night when he believed he 
had the element of surprise on his side.
194
 The strength of the cacos, as in most 
insurgencies, was their knowledge of their native land. Peralte’s forces deftly avoided 
Marine and gendarmerie patrols, which frustrated military leadership in Port au Prince. 
The use of natural land barriers such as rivers and mountains maintained the occupation 
at an arm’s length. Knowledge of the trails provided opportunities to ambush patrols and 
negate Marine fire superiority. As pressure mounted from patrols, Peralte relied more and 
more on the local people for intelligence about the occupation forces.
195
  
The Marine forces had an advantage over their caco foes for several reasons 
including arms, technology, and training. Smedley Butler had ensured that the 
gendarmerie carried effective weapons, which the Marine brigade used a broad range of 
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effective weapons that the allies had perfected during WWI. The Browning Automatic 
Rifle (BAR), was both accurate, powerful, and could be operated by only one man, 
providing a particular advantage in firepower.
196
 The cacos of 1919 were no better armed 
than those that had fought in 1915, which meant that they used obsolete rifles, improvised 
ammo, and no machine guns. Improved aircraft and air tactics gave the occupation forces 
the ability to bomb and strafe a defenseless enemy at will and provide intelligence on the 
locations of caco encampments.
197
 The jungle and the broken landscape often nullified a 
pilot’s ability to spot camps, but despite this challenge, many encampments were located 
by aircraft. The psychological effect of facing a hostile airplane without any means of 
defense or attack proved immeasurable. The movement of pilots and planes from one 
section of Haiti countered flare-ups without requiring a large air contingency.
198
 The 
Gendarmerie d`Haiti was also trained by the U.S. Marines, and received pay for full-time 
service. Cacos were ordinary citizens that had families to maintain; chieftains paid their 
men in loot, which was difficult to obtain under the conditions of the 1919 revolt.
199
 
Cacos stayed and fought when they could, but they often had to leave for their regular 
duties.
200
 The unreliable nature of caco armies meant that caco leadership could not rely 
on a consistent force and had to adjust tactics based on frequent changes in their rosters. 
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Military training and experience had taught the occupation forces in Haiti that constant 
patrolling kept insurgency on its toes.
201
 The cacos had to live in fear that patrols or 
aircraft could encounter them at any time. 
Peralte’s revolt began around his hometown of Hinche, which gave him access to 
his community for support and provided an occupation target that was isolated but still 
significant. Hinche was where the gendarmerie had arrested him for allegedly attacking 
the government paymaster, and where he went after his escape from prison.
202
 Hinche 
lays in a basin between two sets of mountains and in 1918 had only limited roads 
connecting it to the rest of Haiti. Hinche was also the district command center that 
oversaw the client-government in the surrounding area.
203
 The Hinche district was in the 
Central Department, which was one of the three sections dividing up the zones of 
occupation.  
Peralte understood that if he could take Hinche with his local supporters that 
others would flock to his banner, while occupying forces would be discredited in the eyes 
of his countrymen. Hinche could also be a good central base for Peralte’s forces because 
of local support and its isolated central position in Haiti. From Hinche, he could connect 
with the caco bands of the north and potentially attack the capital of Port au Prince in the 
south. He gathered a significant force to overwhelm the gendarmerie detachment at 
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Hinche, but confided his attack plan along with its date to Philecles Lacraix.
204
 Lacraix 
immediately sent his wife to the gendarmerie garrison to inform it that Peralte’s force 
would attack on the 15
th
 of October between 9 and 10 pm.
205
 This intelligence was co-
opted by several other villagers in Hinche and became so well known that all the people 
of that town asked for protection. The men slept in the “Bureau of the Gendarmerie” 
while the women were given quarters in the local prison.
206
  
Both the cacos and the gendarmerie prepared for the attack with effective plans, 
which allowed the cacos to believe that their night attack would be upon an unprepared 
sleeping enemy. The cacos’ attack, undoubtedly planned by Charlemagne Peralte, was a 
three-pronged assault designed to instill panic upon an unprepared enemy force. One 
band would approach from behind the sentry post while another one would cross the 
Guyamouc River, with the third group coming from the brickyard to arrive at the other 
end of town. The idea was that they could converge on the gendarmerie garrison as 
members rose from their beds in order to prevent their escape.
207
 The gendarmerie 
commander Lt. Patrick Kelly also divided his forces, stationing a force under a native 
sergeant named Jean Eucher at the barracks while Kelly and two other lieutenants took 
separate forces into the town. Lt. Kelly’s force patrolled the settlement while Lt. Freeman 
Lang, with fifteen men, remained at the cemetery, at a junction point in the city.
208
  
The attack began at 9:40 pm as planned with each side having some difficulty 
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engaging the other. The sentry at the barracks fired upon the group coming from behind 
before the other two caco bands were in position.
209
 This shot from the gendarmerie 
sentry forced the cacos to engage despite poor positioning because their plan relied 
heavily on surprise.
210
 Luckily for the gendarmerie, Lieutenant Lang’s men in the 
cemetery found themselves in the perfect position to flank the attacking cacos. Lang 
rushed his men into position and ordered them to fire into the attacking cacos, but due to 
their lack of experience, the gendarmerie in the rear section of the firing line killed two of 
their own, and nearly killed Lang; these were the only two losses the gendarmerie 
suffered that night.
211
 Lang regained control after being grazed by a bullet and ordered a 
charge that drove off the remaining cacos attackers. The gendarmerie counted up 35 dead 
cacos signaling a crushing defeat for Peralte’s first major attempt at fighting his 
enemy.
212
  
Prior to this, Colonel John H. Russell, Jr. had arrived in Haiti in April 1917, like 
many Marines, focused greatly on getting off the island. Russell had bombarded Marine 
Corps Headquarters with requests for a transfer to France but did not get reassigned until 
December 1918. His focus for intelligence during this first brief period in Haiti was on 
the German minority population; he said: “The recent war has afforded an opportunity for 
the elimination of this class [Germans] from commerce and politics.”213 Russell missed 
the war in France and remained in Haiti long enough to be there when the October 15, 
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1918, attack on Hinche occurred. As the commander of the 1st Provisional Marine 
Brigade stationed in Port au Prince, he noted incorrectly that, “This affair has no political 
or military significance whatsoever.”214 Russell had, like most Marines in Haiti, focused 
on the possibility of a German incursion onto the island rather than the “bandits” of the 
hinterland. He would remedy this misjudgment about his future enemy when he returned 
to Haiti on October 1, 1919.   
Charlemagne had managed to grab the attention of the Gendarmerie d`Haiti, who 
continued to report his position and possible connections with locals.
215
 Their leadership 
in Port au Prince had not expected a direct assault on one of its garrisons and so launched 
an immediate investigation. Haiti had not experienced many outright attacks on military 
authority since 1916. The deputy chief of the gendarmerie went personally to assess the 
situation. He described the courage of both native and U.S. gendarmerie but found that 
they had not located Peralte’s forces.216 The gendarmerie continued to seek intelligence 
on Peralte’s location. They used local civilians as vital sources of intelligence and soon 
began to organize their sources into informal units of vigilantes.  
The establishment of the vigilantes, a pro-occupation militia force, took a page 
directly out of the caco handbook. The occupation’s use of local civilians was a major 
innovation that occurred organically in the field. Vigilantes sought intelligence on cacos 
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in their area and even got into minor scrapes with the cacos. Vigilantes received pay for 
their service and often aggressively tracked down their neighbors that opposed the 
occupation.
217
 The use of these informal militias was, in part, a formalization of the 
informant network that the occupation had been working to form since it came to Haiti. 
The use of vigilantes began naturally, thanks to the initiative of Marines leading the 
gendarmerie. Many of these Marines had learned to rely on intelligence given by civilians 
but many of those exchanges had been random and often resulted in poor intelligence. 
Vigilantes were full time agents for the occupation that drew pay and even participated in 
some small fights.  
The district commander at Hinche created some of the first vigilantes when he 
came upon some villagers that had their homes looted by cacos not long after Peralte’s 
attack on Hinche. He described how he recruited them: “[We] called together men whose 
homes had been ravished by the cacos. These men were used to form a secret service 
corps and were sent out to obtain information as to the whereabouts of the main band of 
cacos.”218 The Hinche commander received correct intelligence from one of his new 
“secret service corps” that a great band of cacos was at La Plage. When a patrol acted on 
the intelligence, it proved correct.
219
 This episode, and others like it, proved to the 
occupation forces that they could rely on untrained allies in the hinterlands of Haiti for 
valuable intelligence. Vigilantes limited the places cacos could go for support and slowly 
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eroded the ability of rural citizens to help cacos in the field. These occupation supporters 
also went out on patrols with gendarmerie and supplemented their forces when needed.
220
  
The information that the Haitian occupation supporters provided the Marines gave 
them a distinct advantage in preventing the caco surprise attacks. Intelligence efforts 
began exposing most of Peralte’s surprise attacks in advance. The cacos had to rely 
largely on safe havens and economic support from locals to maintain their small war 
tactics against the occupation. As these areas of support shrunk due to spreading use of 
vigilantes, the cacos ability to strike at occupation forces decreased dramatically. 
Contributions by vigilantes and other Haitian supporters that formed an essential 
intelligence network for the occupation proved decisive in defeating the caco threat. 
 Despite his defeat at Hinche, Peralte made an alliance with many caco leaders and 
gained a following that extended his influence throughout much of the North and Central 
Departments of Haiti.
221
 His widened influence increased the size of his force, but it 
remained dispersed. Caco forces were part-time warriors that had to consider family 
obligations when choosing to fight. They could not centralize their troops for long 
without serious attrition from men leaving to care for their families. Peralte also feared to 
bring his full forces to bear because they would be in danger of being wiped out by 
superior Marine firepower.
222
 These conditions forced him to harass the occupation 
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forces in many places simultaneously. It is possible that Peralte was trying to thin out 
occupying forces by requiring them to protect everything. Peralte claimed that he now 
had control in Valliere, Fort Liberte, Grande Riviere du Nord, Le Trou, the Cap, St. 
Michel del`Atalaye, Gonaives, Petite Riviere du l`Artibonite, Lascahobas, and 
Mirebalais.
223
 Peralte enlisted more caco members as his influence grew and now he felt 
ready to expel the “blans” from his native land.224  
As Peralte gained strength, the leadership of the 1
st
 Provisional Brigade began to 
understand the depth of the problem he posed. Due to the decentralized intelligence 
system of the occupation, they did not know how large Peralte’s revolt had gotten until he 
began to take aggressive action against his enemy. Charlemagne Peralte had become a 
major problem for the Marines in Haiti because he had been able to show the world that 
all Haitians did not support the occupation of Haiti and that it had not been a purely 
benevolent action by the U.S.
225
 Peralte also provided a military challenge to the Marines 
because of the size of his forces and his growing popularity. Peralte believed that if he 
could maintain his rebellion or take ground against the occupation, the foreign powers 
would have to side with him against the U.S.
226
 His letter to the British charges d’affaires 
in Port au Prince paints an impressive picture that encouraged the British to side with him 
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and turn over the city before attacked.
227
 Peralte understood that to make a real 
impression on these powers he had to prove that his force was more than a “bandit” army 
but rather a legitimate and lasting revolution. Peralte understood that his base of supply 
was limited and that he could not flee because the Dominican Republic was already under 
the control of the U.S. Caco supplies were decreasing because of vigilante efforts in the 
hinterland and the growing number of offensive patrols launched by the Marines.
228
 If he 
could not gain international recognition the stranglehold of the Marines on his supplies 
would eventually force Peralte to yield.  
Peralte, therefore, had to make a real territorial gain or be chipped away through 
attrition. His first attack on Hinche proved disastrous. One of the greatest challenges he 
faced was keeping his plans secure from occupation sources. His forces could not be 
screened effectively because vigilantes and informants were everywhere.
229
 The 
traditional caco action to take power in Haiti had always been the seizure of Port au 
Prince. Peralte now had to risk bringing his forces together in order strike a decisive blow 
against the client-government.   
Just as Port au Prince entered his sights, Russell returned to command the 1
st
 
Marine Provisional Brigade on October 3, 1919.
230
 Russell’s time in the Office of Naval 
Intelligence and the Naval War College had taught him solid techniques on how to 
                                                 
227
Ibid., 419.  
228
 Leo J. Daugherty III, Counterinsurgency and the United States Marine Corps Volume 1, the First 
Counterinsurgency Era, 1899-1945 (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2015), 81. 
229
 Ibid., 91.  
230
 Leo J and I. I. I. Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898-1945: Profiles of Fourteen 
American Military Strategists (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland, 2009), 250. 
76 
 
 
 
collect, analyze, and distribute intelligence. Educated at Annapolis Naval Academy and 
experienced in administrative roles, he knew how to improve a command, having just 
finished demobilizing U.S. troops returning from WWI.
231
 Russell began by establishing 
a pattern of sharing valuable intelligence between the gendarmerie and the Provisional 
Brigade in Port au Prince.
232
 He also set up Marine and gendarmerie posts throughout the 
hostile zones of Haiti to gather intelligence. Radios at these posts allowed secure 
intelligence to be shared immediately even though Russell still expected timely typed 
reports. The function and structure of the reports also changed.  
The regular reporting of German civilian whereabouts and vain attempts to 
connect them with future German landing attempts ended as client-government deported 
most of the suspicious Germans in 1919.
233
 The reports focused on Haiti and conditions 
affecting its stability. The reports had not reached their zenith, but they had become far 
more useful than those few reports that had reached the leadership in the early days of the 
occupation. The intelligence reports began to take on a more formal shape and include 
more details about how events took place. Improved records being shared up and down 
the chain of command allowed mutually beneficial information to be pooled through the 
command structure and ensured that pertinent information would get to where it those 
that needed it. The use of intelligence officers, a concept developed during WWI, allowed 
Russell to create a dedicated military intelligence bureaucracy that could be called upon 
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to maintain and analyze the intelligence record.
234
 WWI had taught U.S. military 
personnel to collect and analyze documents found on dead enemy.
235
 The archival record 
had many such documents from Peralte and his compatriots, providing invaluable 
intelligence.
236
  
Patrolling remained central to the intelligence-gathering mission of the occupation 
forces. They innovated on the previously more cumbersome large sized horse patrols. 
They now introduced the use of two types of patrols: intelligence gathering or recon 
patrols that were lightly armed and avoided direct engagements where possible.
237
 The 
combat patrol formed the second category and followed up on the intelligence gathered 
by the patrol. The combat patrol carried machine guns such as the Benet gun or automatic 
rifles like the BAR.
238
 They also used larger numbers of Marines. The combination of 
these two methods allowed cacos to be located without making contact and losing the 
majority of the camp. Now a recon patrol could locate a group of cacos and then inform 
the better-armed combat patrol. The combat patrol could engage the cacos with 
foreknowledge rather than stumbling through the bush into accidental and brief contact. 
Better preparation and more importantly intelligence, gave the combat patrol the 
opportunity to take entire bands at once. The joint assault on a hill in 1920 provides a 
thrilling example of how combat patrols could use the intelligence given to them by a 
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reconnaissance patrol.
239
 Occupation forces surrounded a large group of cacos that sat 
comfortably on a hill and then a coordinated air attack scattered the native force into the 
guns of the waiting combat patrol.
240
 Combat and reconnaissance patrols proved a deadly 
combination that covered more ground at an increasingly rapid pace.  
The technological innovations from WWI also gave the Marines an advantage 
over their caco enemies. The occupation used the airplane for patrols that could identify 
the location of a caco concentration without much risk of attack. All the deaths of Marine 
pilots in Haiti were accidents.
241
 Most occurred during taking off and landing because of 
the fragile nature of the newfangled aircraft.
242
 The weakness of air patrolling was the 
jungle, which covered much of the caco held areas and prevented the pilots from seeing 
any clear targets. Jungles also made navigation difficult and thus made it more difficult to 
report sightings accurately. A Marine that would become one of the most decorated of the 
twentieth century, Lewis “Chesty” Puller, helped to reduce this problem when he served 
as a young gendarmerie junior officer by riding along in a plane to show the pilot the 
indigenous landmarks that could show him his approximate location.
243
 Still this 
technology only produced some limited results in patrolling which forced the Marines to 
rely on tried and tested techniques for more consistent information. The dissemination of 
intelligence received a huge boost due to technology. The use of wirelesses and even 
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telephones meant that information gleaned anywhere throughout the occupation zone 
could be shared faster than ever before.
244
 This technology became even more helpful as 
gendarmerie and Marine units shared intelligence more dependably.  These technological 
improvements made it possible to tract the movements of an enemy from province to 
province without ever needing to make contact. Even when a caco group managed to 
elude patrols, aircraft, and native agents, their attacks revealed their position to the entire 
occupation force. Russell’s use of improved communication and cooperation between 
occupation forces made military intelligence a strong weapon against the caco threat.  
Although Russell’s changes had not yet been fully implemented by the time 
Charlemagne Peralte attacked Port au Prince, they still managed to provide intelligence 
about the impending attack.
245
 The exact source of the information is not given in reports, 
but just like the caco attack on Hinche in 1918, someone friendly to the occupation came 
forward. It is assumed by some that Peralte’s letter to the British charges d`affaires in 
Port au Prince turned over the letter sent to him threatening an eminent attack.
246
 There is 
no paper trail to prove this but it seems plausible. At 4:00 a.m. on October 7, 1919, three 
hundred cacos advanced on the city in loose formation, funneling through the streets and 
alleyways.
247
 Entering Port au Prince from the north, the cacos came into contact with 
gendarmerie and Marine machine gun positions flanked by entrenched riflemen.
248
 The 
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caco assault broke up within two minutes and soon after Marine-led patrols pursued the 
beaten rebels away from the capitol. The following day, a gendarmerie patrol led by 
Lieutenant Kemp C. Christian attacked and took Peralte’s command post.249 The 
gendarmeries killed thirty-five cacos and captured the only artillery piece that they 
possessed.
250
 Peralte escaped but had to recover his reputation in order to gain political 
ground against the client-government.  
Just as Russell took command of the 1
st
 Provisional Brigade in October of 1919, 
one ambitious Marine serving in the gendarmerie was making plans to overthrow the 
chief caco in Haiti. Peralte had become target number one for all occupation forces.
251
 
They believed that if they could kill him, they could get the rest of the cacos to stop 
fighting. Peralte compensated by keeping himself guarded by at least thirty men at all 
times and by staying clear of military engagements. He also never remained in the same 
spot more than three days at a time to avoid patrols and vigilantes, using female 
supporters to carry his numerous communications to allies and supporters in order to 
avoid any possible betrayal.
252
 Peralte’s clever maneuvers to protect himself and his 
cause proved difficult to overcome, and time after time, he slipped through the 
Americans’ fingers.  
Herman Hanneken, an enlisted Marine commissioned as captain in the 
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Gendarmerie d`Haiti, took it upon himself to take down the elusive caco. Hanneken had 
served in Haiti since 1915 and spoke Haitian Creole well.
253
 He served in Grande Riviere 
du Nord in 1917-1918 and had already begun to gain allies there before headquarters 
assigned him as the commander of the garrison in August of 1919.
254
 While stationed 
near Hinche, Hanneken had participated in the failed hunt for Peralte in the wake of his 
first attack.
255
 Peralte’s cacos mostly resided in central Haiti, but Grande Riviere was in 
the North.  Peralte’s willingness to go north can be explained by his defeat at Port au 
Prince in October of 1919 and his need to show foreign powers he could achieve a 
victory.   
Hanneken believed that he could draw Peralte into attempting to take Grande 
Riviere under the right circumstances. If Grande Riviere could be seized and there was 
sufficient local caco help, Peralte would be foolish not to act. Hanneken determined to 
create the illusion of conditions favorable to Peralte by setting up a fake caco army at 
Fort Capois.
256
 Hanneken understood that the use of vigilantes had been efficient and so 
he chose to use his native allies to trap the chief of the cacos. Jean Conze had been a caco 
chief before the occupation began but had lived peacefully among occupying forces for 
the previous few years. Conze also knew and respected Hanneken from his previous time 
in Grande Riviere.
257
 Hanneken drew up a secret plan with Conze, a local Gendarmerie 
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named Jean Edmond Francois, and another Haitian named Cherubin Blot.
258
  
First, Hanneken publicly insulted Conze by cursing at him in the public market in 
Grande Riviere.
259
 Conze promptly went up to the old fort Capois; this same fort had 
been used as a resort when the Marines first landed in Haiti but had been abandoned after 
the cacos were defeated there by Smedley Butler. Conze made it known that he would 
drive the “blans” into the sea and recruited local men into his caco force.260 Soon, 
Francois, a gendarmerie private joined Conze after being hit by Hanneken with his riding 
crop.
261
 All of this pageantry had to be backed up with booty or Conze’s men would 
leave him, so Hanneken used his money to fund Conze’s caco band. Hanneken later 
applied for a refund of over $823 U.S. currency for his expenses in supporting the fake 
caco band.
262
 The list of materials provided included suits for Conze, gift suits for 
General Papillon, and even cola.
263
 
Conze began to send letters to Charlemagne Peralte as soon as he established his 
force and invited him to come to Fort Capois to join in an assault on Grande Riviere. The 
letters insisted that not only was the target ready to be taken but that it was valuable 
because it was at the end of a narrow gauge railway line which supplied all occupation 
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forces in the north.
264
 Conze insisted that Peralte should bring men to help him take the 
town and then be there to preside over the triumphal entry into the defeated city. To 
prove the fighting efficiency of Conze’s caco band, Hanneken orchestrated several 
attacks on Fort Capois. Hanneken did not press his attacks past 500 yards beyond the fort 
and only used small numbers of his gendarmerie force.
265
 Conze always knew when and 
where the attack would come so that he would not be surprised.
266
 Caco leadership began 
to recognize Conze as a real and valuable leader after defending his fort from 
gendarmerie attack. He received visits from some caco chiefs, but Peralte remained aloof. 
During the final assault on Fort Capois, Hanneken separated himself from his men and 
created a fake wound on his shoulder using blood that he had brought with him.
267
 He 
returned to his men with his fresh “wound” and called off the attack.  
As the gendarmeries returned to Grande Riviere, Hanneken took great pains to 
appear to be weak and very seriously injured. Conze claimed to have been the one to 
have wounded him and therefore became even more legitimized in the eyes of other 
cacos.
268
 Hanneken remained in his quarters for a week and used a sling on his arm for 
three more weeks. Peralte’s agents in Grande Riviere now had solid evidence of Conze’s 
legitimacy.  
Just before the battle at Fort Capois, Peralte sent his Minister of War, Papillon, 
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with two hundred men to investigate Conze and kill him if Papillon suspected anything. 
Conze showed off his victory to Papillon and quickly won his trust with bribes of suits. 
Papillon returned to Peralte’s camp in central Haiti and suggested that he move his 
headquarters to Fort Capois. Charlemagne and several of his generals remained 
suspicious, but he chose to follow his minister’s advice.269 Charlemagne arrived at Fort 
Capois on October 26, 1919, with 1200 men prepared to take the weakened garrison at 
Grande Riviere.
270
  
Hanneken had been forced to stay in contact with Conze through the use of 
Francois as a messenger. Francois, and sometimes even Conze, would have to sneak 
down from the fort at night to meet personally with Hanneken to report on their 
progress.
271
 This process was not terribly efficient, but due to lack of personal radios, it 
was the safest option available to their little conspiracy, avoiding the pitfall of exposing 
their plan.  
As Conze and Peralte prepared their assault on Grande Riviere, Conze also 
planned how to ambush Peralte with Hanneken at Mazare thirty minutes from Grande 
Riviere.
272
 Hanneken knew that he could not afford to be directly involved in the fighting 
at the town and so chose this site. Lieutenant William Button and Captain Hanneken 
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planned to surround the area with twenty men and a machine gun. Button, a Marine much 
like Hanneken, was innovative and spoke Creole well. Button had even, one time, 
dressed as a market woman to gain intelligence on caco whereabouts.
273
 As Hanneken’s 
junior officer at Grande Riviere, Button was now learning of the plot to kill Peralte and 
wanted to be involved. Hanneken assigned Conze the task of getting Peralte to Mazare. 
Conze suggested to Peralte that he send Conze and the other generals to attack Grande 
Riviere on October 31, 1919, while he established his command post at Mazare.
274
 
Peralte accepted but also decided to split his forces to attack Le Trou, Ti-Jacques, Bahon, 
and Grande Riviere. Hanneken did not like this attack plan because it forced him to 
defend all these minor cities at once. He could not spread his men so thin and still draw 
out an assault team for the ambush.  
On October 29, Peralte adjusted the plan by deciding to go with the men attacking 
Le Trou.
275
 Whether this was because he did not trust Conze or he simply wanted to be 
part of the assault is not known. Hanneken had to respond to these changes, so he and 
Conze paid Peralte’s cousin who lived at Le Trou to convince Peralte to focus on taking 
Grande Riviere.
276
 This cousin flattered him by insisting that his many supporters in 
Grande Riviere would want to see him arrive soon after the attack. Hanneken received 
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word on October 30
th
 that he had decided to go ahead with the first plan.
277
  
To counter the attack on Grande Riviere, Hanneken had to ask for help from other 
gendarmerie detachments. Cap Haitian sent a group of twenty gendarmeries with two 
Marine officers and a machine gun to help defend Grande Riviere.
278
 Hanneken also 
spread the news that Peralte was going to attack there so other gendarmerie units could 
cut off his possible escape to his base in central Haiti. In a telegram sent out to the 
gendarmerie at Hinche (Central Haiti), the details of Peralte’s clothing and transportation 
were given to ensure that his escape, if attempted, could be hindered. This did not include 
the names of those that acquired the information.
279
  
Peralte remained suspicious and once again threw a curve ball at Hanneken’s 
agents. He assigned Conze to lead the attack on Grande Riviere and informed him that he 
would remain behind at Fort Capois.
280
 The cacos established a passcode (“General 
Jean”) to go through the pickets around the fort. Conze understood that Peralte remained 
suspicious, so when he had left the fort he sent two scouts back to watch his leader.
281
 
When the two scouts caught up with Conze just before the supposed attack on Grande 
Riviere, they informed him that Peralte had moved his camp to a hill in between Fort 
Capois and Grande Riviere. Conze immediately sent Francois to Hanneken and Button at 
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Mazare to report the changes in circumstances. Francois also gave them the code word so 
they could make it through the pickets.
282
  
Hanneken reacted to these developments coolly and chose to trust his intelligence 
agents. He decided to proceed to the top of the hill and kill Peralte if possible. Luckily 
both Marines in the assault team spoke creole and had dressed as cacos with faces 
blackened with burnt cork.
283
 Their disguises functioned well enough due to the night but 
also because Peralte was expecting word from Conze about the success of the attack on 
Grande Riviere. Hanneken’s party pretended to be representatives from Conze sent to 
inform him of a great victory.
284
 Peralte’s hilltop command post was three hours march 
away in the dark of night, but Francois knew the way.
285
 When they arrived at the first 
outpost, the code word was given, and Francois went alone to tell Peralte the news of 
Conze’s success. Francois returned a short time later and let Hanneken know that Peralte 
had given them passage through the rest of the outposts to escort the caco leader to town. 
They passed the first four outposts without incident, but at the fifth outpost they lost their 
cover. Lt. Button had worn a poncho to cover the large BAR that he was carrying up the 
hill. The observant caco sentry noticed the bulge and grabbed at Button’s poncho and 
asked where he had obtained such a nice gun.
286
 Button jerked his automatic rifle away 
from the sentry and responded in fluent Creole, “Let me go. Don’t you see my general is 
                                                 
282
 Ibid. 
283
 Ibid. 
284
 Ibid. 
285
 Ibid. 
286
 Herman H. Hanneken, “Death of Charlemagne Peralte,” November 2, 1919, Records of U.S. Marine in 
Haiti, series 127.8.1, Box Intelligence Reports 1918-1919, folder 4, U.S. National Archives, Washington 
D.C. 
88 
 
 
 
getting away from me?”287 Luckily that was enough to throw off the sentry’s suspicion, 
and the group continued until they reached the final sentry post only a few yards from 
Peralte’s position. There an argument broke out between Francois and the sentries about 
whether the whole group should be allowed through or just Hanneken.
288
 Hanneken, 
pretending to be a high-ranking caco, simply pushed his way past the argument with 
Button and walked towards a fire in the middle of the camp.  
Beside the fire were several men and a woman brewing coffee. There were two 
men armed with rifles, most likely Peralte’s bodyguards, and in between them a man 
Hanneken recognized as Charlemagne Peralte himself.
289
 As Hanneken and Button 
approached the party by the fire, one of the bodyguards pointed his rifle right at 
Hanneken.
290
 The caco yelled for Hanneken to halt or he would shoot, so Hanneken 
grabbed his .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol and fired directly at Peralte. The bodyguard 
fired back, Peralte fell to the ground, while the fire went out instantly. A woman had 
spilled coffee on it, extinguishing the flame. Whether or not it was an accident remains 
unclear, but it certainly provided the intruders with the opportunity to get low and avoid 
being overwhelmed.  
In the next moment, Hanneken was hit in the shoulder by the butt of one of the 
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guard’s rifles, forcing his pistol to the ground.291 Hanneken drew out his second pistol 
firing at any enemy targets, while Button sprayed the area with his BAR to deadly effect. 
The gendarmeries back at the sentry post joined Hanneken on the ground at the center of 
the hostile camp.
292
 These well-trained men maintained a constant fire into the darkness. 
The cacos reformed and charged their enemy but were thrown back by overwhelming 
firepower. After the attack failed, Hanneken dashed to the body of the man he had shot 
and felt a pistol on him which he used to fire into the trunk of the body two more 
times.
293
 Now sure his victim had expired, he dragged the body to the middle of the 
gendarmerie circle.
294
 Immediately after Hanneken returned, there was a second charge 
from the darkness that the small party repelled with little difficulty. 
295
With their leader 
dead, the cacos broke and ran. The gendarmerie remained there throughout the night, 
waiting for a counter attack, which never came. Once the sun rose, they identified the 
body as Peralte, tied him to a mule, and took any documents or weapons left behind then 
headed to town. They counted 35 bodies of cacos, which they did not remove from the 
hill; the brave charges of the cacos had cost them dearly.
296
 They arrived at Grande 
Riviere at 9:00 a.m. on November 1, 1919, and reported their success to Colonel 
Meade.
297
 Peralte’s body was verified by some who knew him well and Hanneken took a 
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picture to ensure that all would know his fate.
298
  
Hanneken’s use of intelligence is just the type of individual adaptation that helped 
to slowly change how the Marines engaged in the task of collecting, distributing, and 
capitalizing on it. Headquarters studied his use of intelligence and counter-intelligence, 
which influenced how they adapted their previous use of military intelligence. His use of 
intelligence and counter-intelligence proved that in counter-insurgency one of the greatest 
weapons is solid information. Hanneken had proved the value of double agents by 
completely controlling Peralte’s moves from Fort Capois all the way to the attack on 
Grande Riviere. This expert use of counter-intelligence constantly fed him false 
information that severely affected his decisions. Hanneken’s inspired ruse about his 
injury and the use of Peralte’s cousin proved decisive in convincing the caco leader that 
his information had remained sound. While he stayed in the dark despite his extensive 
use of agents, Hanneken knew most of what was happening in Peralte’s camp.  
Hanneken’s security of intelligence remained sound; he did not report the names 
of his sources with the intelligence he shared and did not report that he had double agents 
in the field. Widening his conspiracy could have been dangerous to his double agents, but 
he was the sole commander for the sub-district in which he had situated them, so 
Hanneken must have felt confident that he would be informed before any actions would 
be taken against them. Hanneken took long risks by employing a cousin of Peralte to trick 
him, but he felt the possible change in plan from Peralte might destroy all of his hard 
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work. In the end, the use of solid intelligence and calculated risks by Hanneken placed 
him in a false sense of security. In this false reality, Peralte had been led to believe by his 
followers and agents that he had the tactical upper hand. His decisions relied on his false 
intelligence and those incorrectly informed decisions placed him in the range of 
Hanneken’s Browning 1911 pistol.  
The documents gathered after Peralte’s death provided significant insight into his 
intelligence network. Peralte had made connections within the traditional elite and other 
allies, even some in Port au Prince.
299
 The practice of collecting documents paid great 
dividends. The client-government arrested those that the documents exposed as having 
had aided or secretly supported the caco leader.
300
 The blow to caco support in the capitol 
and among the political elites proved another key misfortune for the caco revolt.  
Hanneken and Button were emblematic of the type of Marine that changed the 
Haitian Gendarmerie at this time. Both spoke fluent Creole and developed relationships 
with local people.
301
 Both innovated, sometimes in strange ways, and both used 
intelligence as their main weapon against the cacos. They had both chosen to join the 
gendarmerie to gain experience as officers in the field. The improved morale and 
opportunities that became evident after the end of WWI increased the number of Marines 
in Haiti and allowed them to focus on the task at hand. Intelligence skills learned in 
previous bush fighting or in WWI gave them an advantage that some of the early 
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occupation forces did not have. The subtle changes that this new generation of Marines 
brought about combined with the administrative improvements by the leadership, created 
many more military intelligence successes.  
Despite improvements in intelligence and the dramatic killing of Charlemagne 
Peralte, the cacos continued to resist in parts of Haiti. One of Peralte’s major allies Benoit 
Batraville was a dangerous and elusive foe. Russell described Batraville as “a much more 
aggressive man than Charlemagne but lacking in intelligence and leadership.”302 Russell 
brought his full force and improved intelligence to bear on Batraville. Airplanes 
continued regular recon flights and even participated in one of the first joint air-to-ground 
operations noted in Marine Corps’ history. Knowing that almost all resistance had ended 
in the North with the death of Peralte, Russell focused on the known caco regions of 
Central Haiti. Reconnaissance patrols scoured potential caco locations with no let-up. 
Colonel Little, the commander of Gendarmerie, worked in close concert with Russell’s 
provisional brigade. Shared intelligence and combat strength allowed them to bring 
maximum force to bear in the moments of greatest need. Their combined strength 
amounted to 2,700 Gendarmerie and 1,346 Marines. Batraville may have had up to 2,500 
cacos in his service throughout the several months’ long campaign but he never once 
brought all that strength to bear on his enemy.
303
  
Facing the same logistical challenges of a part-time civilian army, Batraville used 
the intelligence he could gather through traditional caco sources. Batesville's wife was 
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one of his best agents and gathered much-needed supplies while sifting through local 
gossip for actionable intelligence. She even boldly ventured into Port au Prince with 
contingencies on other caco wives when supplies were in high demand.
304
 Batraville 
could not rely on many political insiders like his former leader had because the Marines 
had rounded up many of them thanks to the documents gathered by Hanneken in the 
wake of Peralte’s assassination. As occupation forces improved counter-insurgency and 
information security, they maintained low-level enemy intelligence sources at an arm’s 
length where they could not discover as much useful information.  
Batraville's aggressive military action and lack of high-level sources caused a 
caco defeat that would signal the beginning of the end of his revolt. He decided to attack 
Port au Prince only a few short months after Peralte’s death. Certainly, he intended to 
strike a decisive blow against the occupation, but he also must have hoped to rally new 
support for his cause after the loss of a charismatic leader. Batraville attempted to use 
deception by dressing some of his men in gendarmerie uniforms, but it could not protect 
them from poor information security.
305
 Russell in Port au Prince, was acutely aware of 
Batraville's intention and prepared a solid defense. As 300 cacos neared Port au Prince 
with conch shells blaring and marching in column formation, they met no resistance until 
the outskirts of town.
306
 As they reached that point, occupation forces opened up on them 
with machine guns and rifles from behind a strong barricade. The caco fighters could not 
stand in the path of that firepower without being cut down. Few remained after the first 
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volley, but those who did took cover in homes and behind buildings to return ineffective 
fire from their old weapons. The occupation forces had killed sixty-six cacos and cut off 
many more. The caco commander in charge of the advance fled to his home in Port au 
Prince where U.S. Marines arrested him. Robert and Nancy Heinl in their book, Written 
in Blood, describe the results on caco morale, “Surviving cacos ever after referred to 
this… as ‘La debacle.’”307 Many of the captured cacos gave up valuable intelligence on 
their leadership and possible places to find them.
308
 Many of the caco chiefs began to 
give themselves up to the Marines to save their lives and even helped them convince 
others to turn themselves in to the occupation forces. Aggressive patrols by vigilantes and 
the regular occupying forces in the vicinity of Port au Prince eliminated any remaining 
cacos or caco allies in that region.
309
 Captain Hanneken in the North continued to erode 
Batraville’s potential supporters. He killed a caco leader named Oseris Joseph on April 1, 
1920, while the caco hid without much support of his own men.
310
  
Batraville remained undeterred and fought against increasingly desperate odds. 
Long chances may have contributed to his barbaric displays. Batraville continued to 
collect intelligence using women and local civilians to gain an edge over American 
forces. Finally, his work led to information about a reconnaissance patrol that would pass 
through his area. Reconnaissance patrols, if properly surrounded and surprised, could be 
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taken by caco forces. The lightly armed members of a reconnaissance patrol could not 
respond with machine guns against an overwhelming force. Batraville laid a trap for the 
patrol and waited for his victims, hoping for a dramatic victory. On April 20, 1920, 
Lieutenant Lawrence Muth led the fateful patrol and came into contact with the enemy 
first. A caco bullet struck him, and his men could not reach him before the cacos forced 
them to retreat.
311
 Batraville took Muth half alive into the bush and used voodoo 
ceremonies to play up his minor victory.
312
 Batraville began by making a speech to his 
men and then beheaded Muth against a tree.
313
 Batraville cut off Muth’s genitals, cut out 
his heart, and finally broke open his skull. Cacos captured later reported that some of 
those in attendance consumed Muth’s heart and spread his brain on their bullets.314 
Batraville’s increasingly dangerous military position may have contributed to the 
disturbing behavior he displayed with Muth’s body. He attempted to call upon the 
supernatural power of voodoo to increase his influence in Haiti. He believed that if he 
could connect his dying revolt with that of the ancient native dogmas, many would flock 
to his banner. However, Batraville could not save his insurgency from Colonel Russell 
and the improved intelligence apparatus of the U.S. occupation. The full-time intelligence 
officers in Port au Prince compiled all the names of the caco chiefs discovered after the 
failed attack in January 1920. On their list, they described known facts and locations of 
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the caco leadership.
315
 These lists were updated and distributed until shortly after the 
death of Benoit Batraville. Many of the former caco leadership turned quickly to 
informing on their former allies and as the list of informants for the occupation grew, 
Batraville’s shrunk.  
 A solid tip from a local Haitian gave the gendarmerie Batraville’s position on 
May 19, 1920.
316
 In the early morning of that day, Marines and gendarmerie surrounded 
the camp on top of Morne Ti Bois Pin. One of the first bullets from occupation forces 
went into Batraville and as he tried to stand up one of the attackers finished him off at 
close range with a pistol.
317
 The death of Charlemagne Peralte and Batraville signaled the 
end of the caco revolt. In the next few months the few cacos still resisting either 
surrendered or died in the struggle. By the end of the year, few examples of revolt or 
even violence remained throughout Haiti.  
Marines like Smedley Butler had very successfully defeated the first caco 
rebellion in 1915 with the use of constant long range patrols, excellent training, and 
efficient weapons. These methods made the caco bands melt into the background, but the 
lack of consistent, reliable intelligence allowed them to rise up again shortly after. The 
use of local vigilantes and other civilian sources for intelligence gave the occupation a 
more lasting victory against the cacos. More importantly, the information gathered by 
lower echelons was reviewed and saved by the Marine leadership. Improvements in 
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reporting and distribution made the intelligence gathered useful to all levels of the 
occupation forces. The improved morale of those coming to Haiti gave them more 
ambition in fulfilling their mission. The increased conflict also gave proper motivation to 
those serving in Haiti to rise to the occasion. The path to improved military intelligence 
did not take a direct route in Haiti, but as occupation forces grappled with the challenges 
of their fight, they adapted using outside improvements, individual initiative, and 
technological advances. The Marines in Haiti achieved their desired military objectives in 
1919 and 1920 because they used intelligence to change the game.   
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CHAPTER V 
THE FINAL DAYS 
 As the violence in Haiti decreased rapidly by the beginning of 1921, the U.S. 
Marines and their allies had to discover how to maintain political control of Haiti without 
using violence. Violence had brought the Marines to Haiti and it had kept them there 
when President Wilson wanted to take them out in 1919 but now, without violence, 
Marines would have to adapt to a different kind of mission.
318
 They recommitted to the 
original nation-building objectives that had initially motivated some of them. The U.S. 
State Department after the violence of 1919 and 1920 decided that it needed to take a 
more direct approach in Haiti. Their establishment of a high commissioner allowed them 
to receive regular updates and exercise their power on the ground.
319
 While rural violence 
slowed, the political and social resistance in urban areas increased. The intelligence 
required to keep these developments in check changed what intelligence the occupation 
forces needed. The collection methods also had to adjust to new circumstances and new 
objectives. This thesis emphasizes the importance of individual agency throughout and 
the innovations in intelligence work during the final phase of the occupation provide 
ample evidence of personal initiative. The changing political circumstances provided the 
motive for some of the changes in intelligence but outsides sources of information also 
give the process of improvement a boost.  
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 Hans Schmidt in his excellent work, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-
1934, describes the period directly after the caco revolt as the “Reorganization and 
Rationalization” of the occupation.320 His explanation is apt; Schmidt describes a reaction 
to the caco rebellion in the U.S. The political fallout stateside proved severe as 
Republicans decried the obvious unpopularity of the occupation. Some opposed the 
occupation on principal, but others did so because the previous administration handled it 
poorly. Senator Medill McCormick of Illinois, a strident critic of the U.S. occupation of 
Haiti, described how “administrative reorganization” would be preferable to a complete 
withdrawal.
321
 McCormick was the leading Senator on the Investigation into the U.S. 
occupation of Haiti sent by the Senate in 1921. His investigation led him to believe that 
Haiti still needed U.S. direction but the occupation also needed new leadership and 
reorganization under a central authority. Russell had worked to bring his position as 
commander of the Marine Brigade in Port au Prince some level of supremacy over the 
Gendarmerie d`Haiti, but they could also receive direct orders from the President of 
Haiti.  
Russell expressed his displeasure with this policy when he said, “The absurdity of 
dual control, or of two nations administering the affairs of a country is too obvious to 
need comment.”322 Eventually, in 1922, Russell would be made High Commissioner of 
Haiti with power to override the president. The High Commissioner answered only to the 
State Department directly. Before his appointment as High Commissioner, Russell 
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established his authority over military operations through the principle of natural U.S. 
military supremacy over the Haitian Gendarmerie. Russell passionately reformed the 
occupation from top to bottom but most notably he improved the military intelligence 
practices of the Americans and their allies. These developments made the function of the 
intelligence apparatus reach its highest level since the inception of the occupation.  
 As the caco threat receded in rural Haiti, the 1
st
 Provisional Marine Brigade 
withdrew into Port au Prince.
323
 The gendarmerie remained in the field, still led by U.S. 
Marines, and they continued the work of provincial administration.
324
 Cacos remained in 
rural Haiti, but these groups did not represent an effective danger to the occupation. 
Patrols searched and found minor conflicts with these small bands. The term “bandit” 
applies more accurately to these remaining groups than those of 1919. Most of them 
robbed and harassed any that seemed vulnerable.
325
 Cacos no longer led by a single 
leader or a higher ideal devolved into simple brigands. While there may have been some 
that still hoped to rid their island of U.S. forces, their illicit actions belie any noble 
motive. Cacos that had been drawn to the cause because of the dastardly acts of the 
occupation now sadly acted out similar ways. Any rural support Haitian rebels had once 
enjoyed almost completely dissipated after the people realized they would have to 
support them indefinitely.
326
 Worse still, many of the cacos gave up the names of their 
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supporters and allies when pressed by the occupation.
327
 The dangers and economic cost 
of supporting the rebellion grew too high. The actions against the remaining cacos 
occupied some space in a few reports throughout the rest of the occupation, but most 
reports began to discuss political intelligence.
328
 The Marine Brigade watched and 
reported on the political elites in Port au Prince while the gendarmerie focused on the 
provincial minor elites. Both still kept a look out for possible uprisings but kept their 
main focus on possible political resistance.  
 Political intelligence in Haiti did not suddenly appear as a top priority for the 
occupation after the death of Batraville. Rear Admiral Caperton had used his agent “X” 
to gather political intelligence during the first days of the occupation.
329
 As the State 
Department withdrew its support and direction, the Marine Corps leadership in Haiti 
resorted to using their strength of arms to guarantee compliance. Colonels Waller and 
Butler did not consider political intrigue in Haiti to be their concern.
330
 They did not 
believe that it could amount to much, but the new Marine Corps leadership in Haiti after 
1919 saw how effective Haitian resistance could be, so they began to track political 
developments.  
The political intelligence gathered from 1917 to 1919 often focused on possible 
German involvement rather than shifts in native support. The communications of Dr. 
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Rosalvo Bobo, who represented the northern political powers of Haiti, with his allies and 
representatives passed freely under their noses. Even Caperton had not considered the 
regional politics of Haiti when he opted for Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave for president of 
Haiti. The southern political elites backed Dartiguenave while the northern political elites 
backed Bobo.
331
 When Dartiguenave received American backing and then quickly won 
the vote in the Assemblée Nationale, Bobo’s supporters revolted. The cacos of northern 
and central Haiti had already come to Port au Prince to topple the government of 
President Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam.
332
 The previously described U.S. Marine 
campaign of 1915-1916 ended that regional rebellion. Bobo and other northern political 
elites supported Charlemagne Peralte’s rise in 1918, but Peralte attempted to connect his 
movement to a more nationalistic cause. Peralte’s quasi-national resistance against the 
occupation succeeded in many sections of Haiti but failed to penetrate south of the plain 
of the Cul-de-Sac and Port au Prince.
333
 Hanneken recovered many letters from Bobo and 
other political elites in support of Peralte. The letters even exposed some political 
supporters among the elites in Port au Prince.
334
 This discovery along with a newfound 
understanding of Haitian potential for resistance showed the occupation leadership the 
need of monitoring the political leaders more closely. The new military intelligence 
leadership had emphasized the collection of documents from the dead during WWI and 
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leadership in Haiti took on the procedure by 1919.
335
  
The occupation met the need to observe political elites by using pro-occupation 
agents, intercepting their mail, and general surveillance. The Marines had used these 
methods against the German minority during the days leading up to the revolt of 1919.
336
 
The addition of full-time intelligence officers increased the efficiency of these methods. 
The intelligence officers could also act as full-time handlers for the agents they employed 
and could protect their identities while getting their information to the right sources. 
Political intelligence altered their attention to the Haitian political elites after the evidence 
discovered on Peralte showed that some political elites had supported him. The change in 
focus from the German minority to the native Haitian elites made the surveillance useful 
for occupation leadership. The changing mission in Haiti also provided valuable context 
for the shift in focus.  
The haitianization that had always been the goal of the occupation could now 
begin in earnest with the end of the caco revolt.
337
 The gradual handover of power to the 
Haitian people meant that Marines had to find trustworthy, educated, and pro-American 
candidates for the newly available government posts.
338
 The intelligence gathered on the 
different families and individuals gave the occupation leadership a better judgment of 
whom the occupation forces could trust among the educated elites. The increased number 
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of military intelligence officers delivered the needed infrastructure to provide an agency 
capable of gathering, organizing, and analyzing the needed intelligence.  
The growing interest in military intelligence personnel began during WWI with 
the counter-intelligence efforts against German agents on U.S. soil. The U.S. Military 
Intelligence Division or MID reacted to the increasing number of sabotage attacks in 
America by creating a counterintelligence force from scratch.
339
 Attention to positive 
intelligence increased as the American Expeditionary Force arrived in Europe.
340
 
Learning from French and British intelligence officers, the Americans developed doctrine 
for intelligence officers.
341
 The introduction of intelligence officers as part of the Marine 
brigade began as early as 1918. These officers would dramatically increase the amount of 
information that could be processed and then used.  
While MID developed the counterintelligence, the Office of Naval Intelligence or 
ONI developed a great deal of positive intelligence. Positive intelligence is a term that 
refers to gathering information on potential or real enemies as opposed to 
counterintelligence, which is geared towards stopping the enemy from gaining 
intelligence on friendly forces.
342
 The Naval Attaches program established in 1882 
collected information on naval developments abroad, which included some political 
analysis.
343
 The U.S. Marine Corps had only recently begun to develop relations with 
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ONI; John H. Russell was one of the first to begin this process. His assignment to ONI 
under the innovative leadership of Naval Captain James H. Oliver provided the perfect 
seeding ground for Russell’s ideas about how to improve military intelligence.344 
Working with Lieutenant Commander John P. Jackson, Russell applied the theories of 
scientific management to the budding ONI bureaucratic system.
345
 Their reforms 
separated ONI into three main sections focused on the different types of work. In Jeffery 
Dorwart's thorough analysis of ONI’s history, he quotes Russell describing the changes 
he made in ONI, “[We] eliminated duplication of work and the enormous waste of labor 
occasioned by the reading of all papers and periodicals received in the Office by every 
officer attached thereto.”346 Russell also drew up mobilization plans for Naval and 
Marine Corps mobilization to Europe while serving in ONI.
347
 Russell’s time in ONI 
gave him a unique insight into modern military intelligence.  
As Russell took command of the 1
st
 Provisional Brigade in Port au Prince on 
October 1, 1919, he focused on developing actionable intelligence in the field. Russell 
chose to solve his most immediate intelligence problems first. As previously mentioned 
in Chapter 3, the sharing of intelligence between the gendarmerie and the 1
st
 Provisional 
Brigade gave Russell a much-needed boost in understanding the situation in Haiti.
 348
 The 
gendarmerie units’ experience in the rural areas of Haiti provided valuable insights into 
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the situation throughout the countryside. Russell used separated radio intelligence posts 
to help increase the amount of intelligence he received and improve the speed at which he 
received it.
349
 Russell also used intelligence officers efficiently to collect and analyze the 
massive amounts of information that began to roll into headquarters.  
Russell applied the lessons he learned in ONI, and many of his innovations 
changed the way the Marines practiced military intelligence in Haiti. The most important 
change introduced during and after the end of WWI was the use of intelligence officers. 
They helped Russell make changes to the intelligence system at headquarters. Eventually, 
as violence slowed in Haiti, the intelligence officers redirected their efforts away from the 
few remaining bandits. “All quiet, nothing to report,” is one of the sentences most 
repeated in intelligence accounts after 1920. Eventually, there would appear a letter from 
some gendarmerie unit with someone decrying one of their neighbors as anti-American or 
as attempting to start a new revolt, but most of these accusations turned out to be 
overblown.
350
 Russell also changed the system for organizing incoming intelligence by 
clearly establishing his authority over the gendarmerie and thus forcing all new 
intelligence to go through his office.
351
 This made the intelligence system far more 
efficient by providing a central location for the analysis and organization of new 
information. The command could then make decisions about veracity and vitality of the 
intelligence. It could also be more efficiently distributed to those that needed the 
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intelligence. Finally, Russell attempted to improve relations with the Haitian upper 
classes to gain more intelligence on the changing political situation.  
The introduction of full-time intelligence staff officers greatly enhanced the 
ability of occupation forces to gather, interpret, analyze, and distribute relevant 
information. The use of full-time intelligence personnel had been a tactic employed by 
the U.S. on and off since the revolution, but it had not taken on a major role in the Marine 
Corps during the early twentieth century until WWI.
352
 Corps leadership assigned 
intelligence officers to the brigade headquarters in Port au Prince. They had stewardship 
over the intelligence reports that garrison commanders submitted and they took on the 
role of reformers of intelligence methods. Intelligence officers, in conjunction with 
Russell, implemented a series of reforms that enabled the intelligence reports to be more 
efficient. Under Russell’s direction intelligence, reports began to improve by taking on a 
uniform arrangement.
353
 Russell, a natural progressive, attempted to rationalize the 
documentation process through experimentation.
354
 At one point the form became a fill-
in-the-blank page that had spaces for relevant information. Evidently, this method 
became too restricting because leadership replaced it not long after its introduction.
355
 
The structure of the reports became more formal and less like a letter. Sections appeared 
and became standardized to improve efficiency. The standardization instructed those 
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writing the reports as to which topics headquarters deemed most relevant. Sections like 
political, military, and even social conditions became required elements.
356
  
The Headquarters of the 1
st
 Provisional Brigade began using officers in 
intelligence staff positions in 1919. In 1920, Major Ralph Shepard received a military 
award for “his activity, his intelligence, and his courage in the conduct of the intelligence 
service.”357 Shepard also received praise from Russell for his leadership of the 
intelligence section.
358
 It has been challenging to gather much information about the 
intelligence staff officers that served under Russell, but their names, especially the name 
of Walter N. Hill, appear on every report that came through his office.
359
 They went 
through intelligence reports and analyzed the information. They passed on their analysis 
and copies of the reports with their signature of approval to Russell. This gave Russell a 
far superior system of intelligence than his predecessors. Intelligence officers sent to 
Haiti often knew French, which some of them had employed during the Great War as 
intelligence officers. Their ability to translate documents and personally work with native 
agents made them a valuable asset to the occupation.
360
 Their training in intelligence 
analysis was unique at the time and made them helpful in Russell’s improvement 
projects. They worked with district commanders to increase the efficacy of the reports 
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they received and instructed Marines on the conditions they faced in the hinterlands of 
Haiti. Intelligence personnel worked on a national level, so they could interpret the 
information they received based on that bird’s eye view. If violence surged in certain 
districts, warnings could be distributed to surrounding areas, or if an informant came 
forward to share information, they could be referred to HQ for processing by a fluent 
speaker of the native tongue.  
During the last days of the second caco revolt, the occupation forces captured 
many cacos while others simply turned themselves in when they realized the revolution 
had failed. The occupying forces held each of these cacos and interrogated some them for 
information about continuing caco activities.
361
 Many provided information on their 
former friends that remained at large.
362
 The intelligence staff at headquarters used the 
information they provided to create a list of cacos that they circulated to all the garrisons 
during the summer of 1920.
363
 The list of cacos allowed the Marines in each district to 
know who was still at large and who was already taken care of by the other garrisons. 
The intelligence staff did interrogate former cacos, but it is not clear from the sources 
whether it was systematic. What is clear is that information gathered from former cacos 
made up a significant source base that helped to track down the few remaining fighters.
364
 
In January of 1920, before the death of Batraville, a former caco came forward and 
claimed that one of his fellow prisoners was a chief in the caco organization. Major 
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Walter Hill of the intelligence section received and approved the report, which he sent up 
the chain of command.
365
 Interestingly, in that same report, it is disclosed that scores of 
cacos turned themselves into the occupation forces, but none brought weapons with 
them.
366
 They claimed that only chiefs or sub-chiefs had weapons. More than likely, 
based on other reports, they had buried their weapons for future use. Like most rural 
forms of resistance, cacos used tools like machetes as their main weapons and therefore 
their value extended beyond the needs of warfare.  
Tracking those former cacos became an important mission of the intelligence staff 
at headquarters. They used their advanced communications technologies to inform the 
different garrisons and to get information from them about the movements of their former 
enemies. Papillon, the former Minister of War to Peralte, had given himself up not long 
after the death of his leader.
367
 The gendarmerie held on to him until after the death of 
Batraville. They released him on August 14, 1920, but then immediately began to keep 
track of his travels, associates, and anything that could betray a revolutionary design.
368
 
The gendarmerie worked in cooperation with the 1
st
 Provisional Brigade to maintain 
surveillance throughout all of Haiti. The Brigade focused on keeping the political elites in 
Port au Prince under surveillance while the gendarmerie covered the rest of the country. 
Most of those under observation by the occupation forces did not attempt to renew a 
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rebellion, but some of the political intrigues that had been occurring all along began to be 
noticed by the Americans. 
The accurate mapping of Haiti had long been the dream of Marine commanders 
who continued to work with incomplete and dated maps. The project to create an accurate 
map of the entire nation began in earnest after the end of the second caco campaign.
369
 
The intelligence section of the brigade worked with the aviation section, which provided 
aerial photos of the towns.
370
 The intelligence section would later use those pictures in 
their culminating work, the Monograph of Haiti. A survey already ongoing in Haiti 
seemed like the perfect partner for their project, but cooperation proved difficult. 
Eventually, they created several maps one of which showed the locations of every known 
caco camp. Another map created during this period depicted the dimensions of the old 
Fort Riviere that Marines had stormed in 1915.
371
 The intelligence staff made these maps 
as a response to the very poor maps that the Marines had to use when they first landed in 
Haiti. 
The intelligence officers in Port au Prince, under Russell’s direction, began a 
project to provide a deeper context for future regional intelligence reports. The 
intelligence officers began a project in 1921 that would provide background information 
for all subsequent intelligence reports.
372
 They went to the towns and cities of Haiti one 
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by one to gather as much information as possible. This project helped to complete the 
improved maps of Haiti. The list of topics included Terrain/General aspect, Strategic 
Importance, Communications, Accommodations, Food, Fuel, Forage, Climate, Water 
Supply, Inhabitants, Occupation/Industries, Facilities for repairs/Munition making, Public 
Utilities/civic improvements, Buildings, and Fortifications.
373
  
These town-by-town reports provided the context for future reports and therefore 
focused on more constant attributes of each area. This wise adaptation to their previous 
system of intelligence reporting gave headquarters a deeper understanding of the 
conditions of places it could not visit often. When a new intelligence report came from a 
district commander or even a sub-district chief, intelligence officers could now combine 
reports with the information already gathered about that area. The total sum of the 
situation was more easily seen by intelligence officers situated far from those reporting to 
them. The use of radio stations, mail air delivery, and motorized vehicles all made the 
time it took to report to headquarters narrow dramatically.
374
 Intelligence personnel 
distributed lists of potential troublemakers and received updates on their whereabouts and 
actions.
375
 The effect of these reports furnished the information about current events with 
a contextualized understanding of each town due to the long-term information they 
provided.   
Cooperation with the local people in obtaining intelligence proved a vital 
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innovation that had been encouraged since the beginning by the occupation leadership but 
which only truly blossomed in the last years. Marines’ subtle increase in collaboration 
took place over several years and occurred in varying degrees. The leadership had 
stimulated this teamwork through orders like Smedley Butler’s command to NCOs that 
specifically called for the cultivation of good relationships with the local people.
376
 
Individuals had to take action to fulfill those orders with a special level of dedication if 
they wished to win over the oft abused Haitian people. Natural suspicions of authority 
from Port au Prince, and worse still a white foreign power, made it difficult for the rural 
Haitian population to trust the Americans. Success depended on the open-mindedness, 
compassion, and sincere desire of the Marine and the local Haitian people. Treaty 
programs attempted to cultivate a sense of charity for the local population and aspects of 
U.S. reasons for being in Haiti related to the improvement of the lives of the poorer 
classes of people, but the use of the corvée had gone a long way to nullifying any good 
feeling those programs produced. Many successes were achieved because both groups 
could see how they could benefit from the relationship.  
Cooperation with local people continued to increase, and in some cases, led to 
mutual respect. The different occupation forces in Haiti, the Marine Brigade, and the 
gendarmerie created very different experiences for the Marines that served in them. 
Marines attached to the gendarmerie had to adapt to working with native Haitians under 
their command. Not every American assigned to the gendarmerie learned to respect those 
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with whom he served, but the successful ones did figure out how to create a feeling of 
mutual esteem. The command in the gendarmerie relied on the compliance of native 
troops to maintain order. Many Marines like Lewis “Chesty” Puller, Herman Hanneken, 
and others like them chose to work with their subordinates, achieving tremendous effect. 
Hanneken’s greatest success in intelligence work only came about because he trusted and 
relied on his Haitian troops.
377
 He understood that without mutual respect he could not 
hope to achieve exceptional results. Hanneken established a relationship with Jean-
Baptiste Conzé well before he called on him to risk his life for the benefit of the 
occupation.
378
 Puller had his first combat experience at the head of a mule supply train 
that accidentally came upon a much larger caco force. Puller’s men followed his reckless 
charge into the massive enemy force without flinching.
379
 He also noted the exceptional 
quality of his NCOs who proved loyal to him to a fault.
380
 At one point, while on patrol 
on the border with the Dominican Republic, Puller mentioned that he would love to have 
the white horse of a man he could see riding on the other side and his second in command 
Second Lieutenant Augustin B. Brunot immediately ordered a man to shoot the rider. 
Before Puller could react the gendarmerie shot the rider and, although Puller was upset, 
he did not punish his subordinate because Brunot explained that he assumed that Puller’s 
statement had been a command.
381
 Some Marines, like Puller, learned to appreciate those 
that served alongside them in the gendarmerie, but others did not to absorb the lesson.  
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Racism remained an endemic problem for those serving in Haiti, which prevented 
some Marines from effectively working with those they had come to help. The deep-
rooted racism in some Americans blinded them to the dangers of the growing caco 
rebellion in 1918. Occupation leadership had to reassign those that could not overcome 
their feelings. Lieutenant Colonel Jon T. Hoffman describes the attrition rate for enlisted 
Marines serving in the gendarmerie as “nearly one third” of all those assigned from 1919 
to 1920.
382
 That was even after the end of WWI, which had drawn out scores of Marines 
that wanted to be in the real fight rather than a backwater. Even until the end of the 
occupation reports of racism or inappropriate treatment of local people remained a 
problem.
383
 The Marine brigade may have had a more difficult time adapting to the racial 
conditions of Haiti because of their isolation in Port au Prince, where it existed in a 
segregated society within the greater city of Port au Prince.
384
 The Marines serving in the 
far-flung gendarmerie had the advantage of being forced to associate with none but the 
Haitian people.  
The instances of mutual respect and cooperation among the gendarmerie are much 
more widespread than those serving in the isolated brigade. Faustin Wirkus successfully 
fought against the cacos during the revolt of 1919 but when the gendarmerie leadership 
reassigned him to a peaceful outpost, he gained a reputation as a just and caring 
administrator. Wirkus grew so at home on the Island La Gonave that the local people 
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gave him the honorary title of “White King of La Gonave.” Wirkus’s theory of working 
with the Haitian people essentially became one of being on “friendly terms” with all 
classes of the population.
385
 Some Marines also learned to hide their negative racial views 
to avoid causing problems in their command. Most notable in this group was John 
Russell, who worked closely with the Haitian political elite as the High Commissioner of 
the U.S. State Department. He believed in American laws of segregation, but acted with 
courtesy towards the Haitian people.
386
 Russell has been called a racial moderate for his 
time, but his views did not include full racial equality between people of different 
ethnicity and skin color.
387
 He achieved impressive results in Haiti to a significant degree 
because he could put aside unenlightened personal feelings to accomplish the task 
required of him. It is not known the exact number of Marines that learned to work 
efficiently with the Haitian people, but those who did achieved much greater success 
militarily, socially, and politically.  
Political intelligence did not provide accurate information about the intentions of 
those under surveillance. Even Marines willing to work with the Haitian people failed to 
understand the native viewpoint because of their worldview. This challenge especially 
affected the work of intelligence. In her cultural analysis of the occupation of Haiti, Mary 
Renda explains, “Marine Corps intelligence officers’ conducted extensive investigations 
to ascertain what Haitians thought. Yet… the intelligence they gathered was always 
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filtered through the lens of their discursive frameworks.”388 The use of cultural 
information, though at times tainted by bias, still contributed to intelligence objectives of 
the occupation. The 1921 city analysis started the process of describing the circumstances 
of daily life in each of the different garrisons around Haiti.
389
 Intelligence staff would 
catalog further information in the Monograph of Haiti that the intelligence officers at Port 
au Prince compiled in 1932. 
The intelligence officers of the Marine Brigade in Port au Prince reacted to the 
instability of the Borno regime by using targeted political intelligence. Previously this 
information received had come from gendarmerie reports, intelligence personnel reports, 
and randomly scattered reports voluntarily given from local citizens. The gendarmerie 
reports provided vital information about political or social conditions in the many 
garrison towns throughout Haiti. 
390
This report gave insight into specific individuals from 
those localities and helped to paint a picture of major shifts.
391
 The weakness of these 
reports was that they were the observations of the military leadership rather than inside 
information. The intelligence from this source also lacked a national perspective that now 
had become vital. Intelligence personnel serving in Port au Prince could provide 
intelligence on nationally significant targets, but they remained outside the inner circles 
of nearly all of those who were now politically influential. The voluntary citizen reports 
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had primarily consisted of folks exposing their neighbors, often without much result in 
vital political or military intelligence.
392
 The previous methods had led to somewhat of a 
shotgun spread of political intelligence that worked fine under the Dartiguenave regime, 
which gave deference to the American High Commissioner Russell. Louis Borno, a pro-
American politician that worked to improve Haiti’s economic situation, replaced 
Dartiguenave in 1922 as president of Haiti.
393
 The changing political situation required a 
more targeted approach that gave specific intelligence on the political movements in the 
capital.  
The use of secret agents that had access to the top levels of the political hierarchy 
provided the needed information. Among the first “secret service” agents found in the 
record was a Mr. Rupert who described anti-American speeches in his reports as early as 
May 18, 1921.
394
 The most prolific of these new agents were Agent Paul and Robert Lan. 
The intelligence reports did not give any other description of either of them other than 
that they had significant political influence and were sympathetic to the goals of the 
occupation. Lan’s reports began to appear sporadically in the record in September 1919, 
but he became a regular informant in January of 1923 and ended his service around 
December of 1924. Some of the earliest reports from Paul begin to appear in the record 
from 1927 and stop coming in May of 1930. Robert Lan gave significant insight into the 
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new regime under President Borno. Some of the intelligence that Paul gave included the 
names of the founding members of the opposition party, the Union Patriotique, founded 
by the U.S. NAACP.
395
 By 1927 the Borno regime had started to lose ground with the 
population, and Paul often provided information about how they attempted to remain in 
power.
396
  
The increased reliance on political agents shows the breakdown of relations 
between the Borno-Russell regime and the people. Russell maintained his authority, first 
as brigade commander and then as High Commissioner, through force and intrigue. The 
intelligence staff of the Marine brigade maintained political agents right up until the end 
of the Borno regime.
397
 At this point, the occupation forces turned over political control 
to the Stenio regime and did not attempt to interfere seriously in Haitian affairs. They 
focused instead on Haitianization and preparing an exit strategy that would leave Haiti 
robust enough to stand on its own.
398
  
For much of the occupation the Americans maintained political stability by 
leaving the Assemblée Nationale dissolved, but after the strikes and student rallies of late 
1929, the Americans felt forced to allow free popular elections.
399
 Much like the North 
Vietnamese Tet offensive of 1968, the strikes of 1929 changed American policy in the 
occupied nation. The State Department rapidly implemented a program of Haitianization 
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without regard to the training of those given new responsibilities.
400
 Before that point, 
Haitianization had been slow and laborious but now it took on a tone of desperation.
401
 
Finding those willing to work with the unpopular American regime became increasingly 
difficult as the inevitability of the end of the occupation became clear. The Forbes 
Commission, sent by President Hoover because of the deaths of Haitian civilians during 
the demonstrations, sought to replace Russell and Haitian President Louis Borno.
402
 The 
Forbes plan suggested that the Haitians vote in a new temporary President in the interim 
before free elections.
403
 Much of the unrest in Haiti had occurred due to Borno’s 
unpopularity and the people’s desire for free elections after waiting nearly fifteen years. 
Eugene Roy took the Presidency in May 1930 while legislative elections took place in 
October of 1930.
404
 The votes went against the pro-American and even moderate 
candidates. Many of the new anti-occupation legislators received support from the people 
because of the prison sentences they had served for speaking out against the 
occupation.
405
 The nationalist assembly chose Stenio Vincent as the new President.
406
 
This new political power of the opposition combined with rapid Haitianization created 
the potential for the loss of military autonomy for the American occupation.  
The dramatic shift in the authority seemed to require increased surveillance of the 
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new political elite, but instead, there is a notable decrease in the information collected 
about the political movements in Haiti after 1930. There are several reasons for this 
change; the first is simply that intelligence personnel focused on the exit strategy and 
what they could do to develop intelligence that would help future military endeavors in 
Haiti. The creation of the Monograph of Haiti is a clear response to this problem. 
Intelligence officers did not finish it until 1932, and its purpose is clearly to prepare for 
future expeditions to Haiti. 
The second reason for the lack of political intelligence post-1930 is that few had 
time to worry about a forgone conclusion. The need for intelligence had existed because 
the High Commissioner had attempted to keep the Haitian government under his 
influence, but now that an anti-American regime had taken over, few felt that the 
intelligence would be worth their time to collect. Finally, the agents that came forward to 
provide intelligence on the Borno regime had been sympathetic to the occupation; now 
the Haitian government did not include hardly any that believed the occupation should 
continue.
407
 Marine Corps intelligence officers simply had no potential sources for 
political intelligence after 1930.  
In 1921, the intelligence staff officers attached to the 1
st
 Provisional Brigade 
began a project that resulted in an impressive catalog of information on Haiti. The 
Monograph of Haiti stands as a pinnacle of intelligence work done by U.S. Marines in 
their country. The information contained in the monograph provides an in-depth view at 
the total sum of intelligence the Marines gathered during their time nearly twenty years of 
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occupation. They did not complete the monograph until 1932, but the intelligence reports 
of 1921 played a major role in the creation of this work. This large unpublished book 
contains an intelligence analysis of the nation as a whole and each town individually. 
Statistics and general statements by intelligence officers attempted to describe the 
society, politics, economics, infrastructure, military, and even environmental 
conditions.
408
 In the preface, the authors clearly define the purpose of their compilation.  
 
“The object of this book is to provide operative, and war plans 
information upon the Republic of Haiti. A monograph aims to be so 
thorough a description of the country upon which it is written that the 
commander of an expedition approaching its coast will have at his 
disposal all the information obtainable to commence active operations in 
case of hostile invasion or a peaceful occupation, and to facilitate his 
diplomatic and routine mission in time of peace.”409 
 
The intelligence personnel created a document they believed could be used when 
the U.S. returned to Haiti. The monograph did not long serve a function as a living 
document because of the removal of U.S. forces only two years after its original 
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completion. The first major topic in the monograph covers the environment of Haiti.
410
 
Lists of islands, mountain ranges, bodies of water, and plains with brief analysis help the 
reader gain a thorough view of the general physical conditions in Haiti.
411
 The 
intelligence officers included an up-to-date map in this section.
412
 Clearly, they had 
learned from the challenges of the early days of the occupation when inaccurate maps of 
unfamiliar territory resulted in ambushes and a series of challenges in tracking enemy 
movements.  
An analysis of the political conditions in Haiti centered on U.S. views about 
Haiti’s chronic political problems. The Marines included a copy of the constitution of 
Haiti drafted in 1932.
413
 This information could be very useful to future occupation forces 
looking to avoid constitutional faux pas. The descriptions of the national situation begin 
with a brief history of the political evolution since the start of the occupation in 1915.
414
 
Each political office and its powers make up the next twenty pages. Then they described 
how the Haitian political system functioned in their experience.
415
 The next part of that 
section covered the political factions. The previous use of sources like Agent Paul and 
Robert Lan certainly made this analysis possible. The following brief political history of 
a pre-occupation of Haiti shows how the intelligence officers still acknowledged the basis 
of the occupation. They depicted Haiti as an unstable and poorly led republic that lacked 
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the political continuity to succeed economically.
416
 The writers warn against the use of 
newspapers by the opposition under a section labeled “Propaganda.” The author relates, 
“The propogands against Louis Borno was admittedly well done.”417 He goes on to 
bemoan the loss of popular support, ascribed almost exclusively to the use of propaganda 
by the opposition. Overall political conditions in Haiti appear to be similar to those at the 
start of the occupation.   
The section on social conditions in Haiti conforms to the view that many Marines 
espoused of two split classes. The monograph states, “Haiti is essentially divided into two 
great classes, the elite or educated class, and the peon, or uneducated class.”418 In this 
part intelligence personnel interestingly encourage the courteous treatment of the 
educated classes. Then the monograph goes on to compare the salons to France to the 
homes of the elites and rural hinterland to Africa.
419
 This view is not all that different 
from initial impressions described by the Marines that first landed in 1915.
420
 The lack of 
change in perspective seems to belie a lack of intellectual engagement in the question of 
social conditions in Haiti. It is not too surprising that this analysis is simplistic due to the 
clerical nature of intelligence staff officer’s duties and the deeply held cultural 
perspective about Haiti that did not meet with much opposition.  
The environmental and economic conditions take up the rest of the section on 
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national circumstances.  The topics of this section are intertwined by how deeply the 
groups affected one another in the view of the writers. Mostly this section uses statistics 
gathered during the occupation to illustrate the weak but improving economic potential of 
the island nation.  
The basic descriptions of the three main military districts established as part of the 
military occupation precede reports on the many towns throughout Haiti.
421
 The use of 
regional and the area-specific analysis is an effective method. Haiti remained a regionally 
divided place even throughout the occupation. The political alliances, economic centers 
of gravity, and the culture could be different from region to region.
422
 The regional level 
view of Haiti also gives the region a more thorough description of how individual cities 
related to one another economically and politically. The writers explained the important 
distinctions between economic and political centers.
423
 The analysis of each town in 
alphabetical order, complete with aerial photos and road maps, gives real insight into how 
an occupation force could again direct those towns.
424
 The lists of great citizens and 
communications equipment show the priorities that had developed during the 
occupation.
425
  
The information contained in the monograph clearly shows the final peak of the 
development of Marine Corps intelligence in Haiti. The in-depth analysis of political, 
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social, economic, environmental and military conditions illustrate how officers, tasked 
with intelligence duties, had come to fulfill their role effectively. Further, the wide-
ranging topic coverage shows that the poor organization of intelligence had given way to 
systematic processes for keeping records. The geographical intelligence is especially 
interesting because it proves that they had learned the value of good maps and robust 
environment intelligence. The foresight for creating a single source for intelligence 
information shows how the reforms of intelligence organization under Russell had 
affected the way the staff interacted with intelligence data. The Marines that many 
believed would have to return in only a few years would be better prepared than those 
that came before them because they would have access to this incredible compendium of 
intelligence.  
The Monograph of Haiti proves the improvement of intelligence methods and 
technologies from the beginning of the occupation to the end. Marines in Haiti had 
learned that they could avoid the pitfalls of the past through intelligence work. Marines 
trying to get out of Haiti during the last few years of the occupation took the time to 
compile all their collected intelligence into one volume for future use; this project shows 
how much some had come to value intelligence information.  
There is little evidence that the intelligence staff did much intelligence work 
beyond the creation of the monograph. The complex nature of the monograph project 
more than likely took up much of the time that the intelligence staff had to accomplish its 
tasks. The Intelligence staff had to type all the pages of the monograph, and do all the 
research on the different topics covered within the over 900 pages of content. It is logical 
127 
 
 
 
that when facing an inevitable withdrawal, the intelligence staff would focus on 
intelligence work that could be useful during future operations in the region. The use of 
political agents ends abruptly after the elections of 1930, and, interestingly, that 
coincided with Russell’s reassignment to the “Planning Section” at Quantico.426 The 
intelligence staff then focused on their withdrawal plans and the monograph.
427
 It’s hard 
to measure the efficacy of the Monograph of Haiti because the U.S. did not intervene in 
Haiti again until the Clinton administration in 1994. Intelligence officers compiled the 
information thoroughly cataloged and analyzed it to provide context to future 
occupations. If the Marines landing in Haiti in 1915 had had access to a work such as the 
monograph, they could have easily avoided some of the intelligence pitfalls of the early 
years.  
The improvements in intelligence during the final years of the occupation took on 
many of the chronic problems inherent in occupation duties. The intelligence staff greatly 
aided the progress of the intelligence work done by all Marines in Haiti. These staff 
officers provided substantial improvements to the documentation process and organized 
incoming information to make it useful to the high command. Russell’s centralization of 
intelligence reporting system greatly amplified efficiency. The intensified use of 
technology, including the airplane and wireless communications, made collecting 
intelligence in a centralized way possible. The political shifts in the central government 
of Haiti and the new arrangements of the occupation leadership made political 
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intelligence increasingly pursued. The grand finale, the Monograph of Haiti provided 
information about Haiti for future generations. Few Marines at the outset of the 
occupation could have imagined how military intelligence would change during their 
mission and how they would play a part in its changes.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Changes wrought over time by human beings occur in messy and unpredictable 
ways. The improvements in intelligence methodology and technology developed slowly 
during the occupation of Haiti. Few Marines, in the beginning, could have imagined the 
way intelligence would change the campaign. At times throughout the campaign 
individual Marines sped up the process due to necessity or because of a personal belief. 
The documentary evidence shows how the desire to serve, personal beliefs, and previous 
experience all affected the way each Marine contributed to the changes in intelligence 
practices. More often than not, outside events (most importantly WWI), altered the way 
Marines viewed and accomplished intelligence work.  
The initial intelligence techniques used by the Marines relied heavily on the local 
population with which they could only rarely communicate. Naval officers and State 
Department officials used agents to collect political intelligence about the Haitian elites 
but the names of any agents employed and even the information they collected never 
made it into the possession of the Marines.
428
 The forced guides of the large patrols at 
times proved useful, but in other moments turned out to be dangerous.
429
 The ambush of 
Smedley Butler’s patrol outside Fort Capois nearly gave a victory to the caco bands.430 
The disparity in arms proved to be the deciding factor of the first caco campaign because 
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even the best-laid traps of the rebel forces could not overcome automatic weapons. The 
offers of bribes, the obvious superiority of Marine weaponry, and the belief that the 
intervention would only be temporary all motivated the cacos to end their resistance. The 
lack of any cataloging information relating to the caco bands including, locations, names, 
and possible source list about caco activities turned out to be a folly that would only be 
fully felt during the second caco campaign. A quick victory over an enemy that the U.S. 
perceived as illegitimate may have also given the impression that the collection of 
intelligence on cacos was not needed. The lack of consistent intelligence doctrine or even 
full time intelligence staff did not help to motivate the use of intelligence. After the 
abandonment of the Marines by the U.S. State Department, the political agents they 
employed ceased to be known, and Marine Crops leadership in Haiti made no attempt to 
obtain new agents of that sort.  
The treaty-related duties of the Marines in Haiti became the central focus of the 
occupiers shortly after the reduction of hostilities with the cacos. Smedley Butler and 
others jumped at a chance to build a new and improved Haiti.
431
 Unfortunately, in the 
process of trying to improve the infrastructure and reform government systems, the 
Marines caused a good deal of harm to their cause. The high-handed means used by them 
and condoned by the State Department undermined much of the potential goodwill the 
occupation could have enjoyed from reform-minded middle and upper class people. The 
use of the corvée system alienated many of the lower class members of society by 
essentially being white-driven slavery by another name. The deeply felt fear of slavery 
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from the not-so-distant past and the strong national pride in the revolution against the 
tyranny of slavery gave any Haitian motive to hate the occupiers. Despite some good 
desires to improve Haiti, much of the work accomplished by the occupation in this period 
made finding intelligence sources more difficult. The little intelligence work that the 
Marines did do in this period focused on the German minority. The outbreak of WWI in 
April of 1917 increased the pace of this intelligence work and blinded the occupation to 
the growing dissatisfaction among the Haitian people. This misdirected focus of 
intelligence proved costly when, without much forewarning, a revolt began in Hinche in 
October of 1918.  
The intelligence failures of the previous period provided an opportunity to learn a 
great deal from the combat that was to come during the caco revolt of 1919. The 
intelligence priority eventually became the tracking down of Charlemagne Peralte, the 
main leader of the uprising.
432
 The leadership at headquarters started to implement 
policies to improve the gathering, analysis, and distribution of intelligence but most of 
these did not come into play until after a single Marine acted out an incredible feat of 
intelligence work to kill Peralte. The use of counterintelligence and positive intelligence 
proved the most crucial tool in Hanneken’s plot to assassinate Peralte. Agents, planting 
false intelligence, creating a fake army, and making deceptive assaults on enemy 
positions all created a false reality for Peralte that he could not see through.
433
 Peralte 
changed the game multiple times, but because of well-placed intelligence sources, 
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Hanneken countered him without missing a step. Eventually, the ability of Hanneken and 
his chief lieutenant to use the native language also proved highly valuable to the 
operation.
434
 The occupation leadership took note of Hanneken’s skills and intelligence 
activities that produced such a dramatic success. They internalized many of those lessons 
and incorporated them into the reform that they planned for the occupation forces in 
Haiti.    
The reforms of John H. Russell Jr. gave occupying forces their first real 
intelligence apparatus in the modern sense of the term. Russell streamlined the 
intelligence reporting system by establishing his authority as commander of Marine 
brigade to receive all reports event those of the separate commander Gendarmerie.
435
 His 
use of intelligence officers, or at least Marine Corps officers that had intelligence duties 
provided a group responsible for the analysis and distribution of intelligence. The use of 
intelligence staff for headquarters had become commonplace during WWI and Russell’s 
time at ONI helped him to understand the importance of this type of work.
436
 The 
improved form of documentation for intelligence reports also aided those serving in the 
far-flung commands of the gendarmerie garrisons know precisely what information the 
headquarters wanted to receive. Headquarters renewed the use of agents to keep track of 
political maneuverings among the Haitian elites. These agents mostly came forward of 
their own accord, but this time the Marines recruited them for full-time espionage rather 
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than send them on their way with simple thanks.
437
 The new intelligence officers 
analyzed and translated the documents that the political agents submitted to the 
occupation. Then they sent them to the leadership of both the gendarmerie and the 
Marine Brigade. The intelligence officers also took on a project to catalog any pertinent 
intelligence information about all towns of any note throughout Haiti.
438
 The project 
began in 1921 and gave vital context to weekly intelligence reports that continued to 
come in from garrison commanders in those areas. Eventually, this project turned into the 
Monograph of Haiti. The intelligence staff intended this publication to provide 
intelligence information for incoming Marines serving in Haiti. Once the occupation 
ended the creators’ hoped the monograph could guide any future expeditions to Haiti.  
The dramatic improvements in intelligence over time in Haiti contain an 
important story. Human attempts to improve often occur in the context of strife and this is 
certainly the case here. The greatest breakthroughs occurred because conflict forced the 
occupation forces to adapt. Changes that came from outside sources also, most 
importantly, resulted from WWI, one of the most difficult conflicts of the twentieth 
century. The failures of the first few years of the occupation related to intelligence but 
they did not occur exclusively because of a lack of intelligence. Improved military 
intelligence facilitated the defeat of rebel forces in Haiti, but once again intelligence did 
not play the only role in the Marines’ victory. This paper has explained how and why the 
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use of intelligence changed over time during this particular campaign. Many of the 
improvements that the Marines instituted during their time in Haiti did not get translated 
into larger doctrine but some lessons did go on in the lives of those who learned from 
personal experience. Future works on the Haitian campaign should seek to define how 
and why military success came to the Marines when political success remained elusive.   
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